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Applications of Game Theory in Operation Management and Information Systems

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Game Theory and Business Applications

Part of the book series: International Series in Operations Research & Management Science ((ISOR,volume 194))

Abstract

In the past 20 years the Operations Management and Information Systems (OM/IS) fields have widely applied game theory these fields had previously been more focused on analyzing and improving the performance of a physical system (e.g., queueing or inventory systems) from the decision theoretic perspective. This chapter gives an overview of the existing OM/IS literature applying game theory. We focus on five topics: (i) time-based competition, (ii) priority pricing for a queueing system, (iii)manufacturing/marketing incentives, (iv) incentives for information sharing in a supply chain, and (v) distortion and alignment in a horizontal supply chain. On each topic, we review one or two works at some length and list other related works as references.

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Acknowledgements

The authors would like to thank anonymous referees and the editor for many valuable comments and suggestions.

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Cheung Kong Graduate School of Business, Beijing, China

    Lode Li

  2. Yale School of Management, New Haven, CT, USA

    Lode Li

  3. Graduate School of Business, Stanford University, Stanford, CA, USA

    Seungjin Whang

Authors
  1. Lode Li
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  2. Seungjin Whang
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Correspondence to Lode Li .

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. , Department of Economics, Pennsylvania State University, University Park, 16802-3306, Pennsylvania, USA

    Kalyan Chatterjee

  2. , School of Management, Boston University, Commonwealth Ave. 595, Boston, 02215, Massachusetts, USA

    William Samuelson

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Li, L., Whang, S. (2014). Applications of Game Theory in Operation Management and Information Systems. In: Chatterjee, K., Samuelson, W. (eds) Game Theory and Business Applications. International Series in Operations Research & Management Science, vol 194. Springer, Boston, MA. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4614-7095-3_5

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