Applications of Game Theory in Operation Management and Information Systems

  • Lode LiEmail author
  • Seungjin Whang
Part of the International Series in Operations Research & Management Science book series (ISOR, volume 194)


In the past 20 years the Operations Management and Information Systems (OM/IS) fields have widely applied game theory these fields had previously been more focused on analyzing and improving the performance of a physical system (e.g., queueing or inventory systems) from the decision theoretic perspective. This chapter gives an overview of the existing OM/IS literature applying game theory. We focus on five topics: (i) time-based competition, (ii) priority pricing for a queueing system, (iii)manufacturing/marketing incentives, (iv) incentives for information sharing in a supply chain, and (v) distortion and alignment in a horizontal supply chain. On each topic, we review one or two works at some length and list other related works as references.


Supply Chain Wholesale Price Coalition Structure Demand Rate Revenue Sharing 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.



The authors would like to thank anonymous referees and the editor for many valuable comments and suggestions.


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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media New York 2014

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Cheung Kong Graduate School of BusinessBeijingChina
  2. 2.Yale School of ManagementNew HavenUSA
  3. 3.Graduate School of BusinessStanford UniversityStanfordUSA

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