Auctions: Advances in Theory and Practice

  • William SamuelsonEmail author
Part of the International Series in Operations Research & Management Science book series (ISOR, volume 194)


Auctions and competitive bidding institutions are important both for empirical and theoretical reasons. The aim of this chapter is to examine the use of auctions, paying equal attention to theory and practice. While theory suggests equilibrium bidding as a benchmark, there is considerable empirical evidence (from controlled experiments and field data) that actual bidding behavior only loosely follows this normative prescription. Thus, it is important to consider the design of auction institutions anticipating actual bidding behavior. The analysis provides normative guidelines concerning “market” performance. What types of auction institutions are likely to promote efficiency? Alternatively, what auction procedures maximize the seller’s expected revenue? In combination, auction theory and the corresponding empirical evidence can provide direct answers to these questions.


Reserve Price Bidding Strategy Combinatorial Auction Bidding Behavior English Auction 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.


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© Springer Science+Business Media New York 2014

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.School of ManagementBoston UniversityBostonUSA

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