Abstract
In this chapter, we propose a formal practice-oriented model for the analysis of cryptographic primitives against side-channel attacks was introduced as a specialization of Micali and Reyzin’s “physically observable cryptography” paradigm [MR04] introduced in [SMY06].
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Notes
- 1.
In our following examples, \(\fancyscript{L}\) is the Hamming weight function.
- 2.$$\begin{aligned}{\text{ Since: }}\, \mathbf{H }[S_g|O]&= \mathop {\mathbf{E }_{O^q}}~\mathop {\mathbf{E }_{S_g}}~\mathbf{H }[S_g|O^q]\\&= \sum \nolimits _{O^q}\mathbf{P }[O^q]\sum \nolimits _{S_g}\mathbf{P }[S_g|O^q]\cdot -\log _2(\mathbf{P }[S_g|O^q]) \\&= \sum \nolimits _{O^q}\mathbf{P }[O^q]\sum \nolimits _{S_g}\frac{\mathbf{P }[O^q|S_g]\cdot {\mathbf{P }}[S_g]}{\mathbf{P }[O^q]}\cdot -\log _2(\mathbf{P }[S_g|O^q])\\&= \sum \nolimits _{O^q}\sum \nolimits _{S_g}\mathbf{P }[O^q|S_g]\cdot \mathbf{P }[S_g]\cdot -\log _2(\mathbf{P }[S_g|O^q])\\&= \sum \nolimits _{S_g}\sum \nolimits _{O^q}\mathbf{P }[O^q|S_g]\cdot \mathbf{P }[S_g]\cdot -\log _2(\mathbf{P }[S_g|O^q])\\&= \sum \nolimits _{S_g}\mathbf{P }[S_g]\sum \nolimits _{O^q}\mathbf{P }[O^q|S_g]\cdot -\log _2(\mathbf{P }[S_g|O^q])=\mathbf{E }_{S_g}~\mathrm{H }_{S_g,S_g}^q \end{aligned}$$
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Peeters, E. (2013). Toward the Evaluation of an Implementation Against Side-Channel Attacks. In: Advanced DPA Theory and Practice. Springer, New York, NY. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4614-6783-0_8
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4614-6783-0_8
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