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Higher Order Attacks

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Advanced DPA Theory and Practice

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Abstract

In the open literature, the masking technique is among the most popular suggested ways to protect an implementation against Differential Power Analysis [AG01, CJRR99, GP99, OMPR05]. However, several works have shown that such protected devices are still sensitive to higher order attacks, originally described in [Mes00].

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Notes

  1. 1.

    We would find \(O_i=W_H \big [S(P_i \oplus S_g) \oplus Q_i \big ]+W_H\big [Q_i\big ]\), which yields \(\varSigma _{g,i}=S(P_i \oplus S_g)\), \(RS_i=Q_i\).

  2. 2.

    Note that modeling the algorithmic noise as Gaussians is reasonable since they approximate the binomial behavior of the Hamming distance values.

  3. 3.

    Due to area constraints, we did not target a standard algorithm such as the AES Rijndael. Indeed, as already mentioned, e.g., in [OMP04, OMPR05] , the hardware cost of masking a block cipher is a real concern for efficient hardware implementations.

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  1. Texas Instruments Inc., Crown Ridge Dr 9820, Frisco, Texas, 75035, USA

    Eric Peeters

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Peeters, E. (2013). Higher Order Attacks. In: Advanced DPA Theory and Practice. Springer, New York, NY. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4614-6783-0_7

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4614-6783-0_7

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