Abstract
Votes in parliament offer one of the few sources of behavioral data to study members of parliaments (MPs). As a consequence, an increasing number of studies rely on such data and by employing sophisticated methods generate new insights on how MP interact with their constituency, their party and their leaders in parliament. This paper reviews the main strands of research in this field and cautions against a too uncritical use of data on parliamentary voting. First of all, in many parliaments, information on individual voting behavior is not available for all votes; and second, votes by MPs are influenced by myriad of factors like their constituency, their party, etc. In addition, votes can obviously only be observed on objects having been admitted to the agenda. Consequently, to take full advantage of the wealth of information stemming from parliamentary voting, the full context of MPs’ choices has to be taken into consideration.
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Notes
- 1.
- 2.
See the study by Andrews (2002) on the Russian Duma for a careful illustration and analysis of cyclical majorities.
- 3.
A similar finding and argument appear in Londregan’s (2000b) work on the Brazilian legislature.
- 4.
Attina (1990, p. 562) notes that in the first elected EP, “only 15 % of the 936 initiative [sic] and urgent resolutions approved” were subject to a roll call vote, while Hix et al. (2006) estimate this share for latter EPs to be approximately a third. More detailed studies by Carrubba et al. (2006) and Thiem (2009) suggest that approximately a quarter of all votes are roll called.
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- 8.
While this approach appears similar to Kalt and Zupan’s (1990), it differs as it puts more structure on the empirical model to be estimated.
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- 10.
Bartels (2008) extends this type of analyses to cover other policy areas.
- 11.
In his study of the Danish Parliament, Skjaeveland (1999) finds an increase in cohesion before elections. Interestingly enough, this effect runs counter to Diermeier and Feddersen’s (1998) argument that as an election approaches party discipline should be more difficult to maintain as the confidence procedure assorted with a threat for early elections becomes less credible. For a system without a confidence vote, namely Switzerland, Traber et al. (2013, forthcoming) show that in the run-up to elections parties become more cohesive, but that this effect depends on the substantive importance of the vote and is not the same for all parties.
- 12.
Strictly speaking, both of these studies are based on the dispersion of the estimated ideal points around the party group, respectively, national parties’ position. In addition, the latter study does not assess the MPs’ preferences independently. Schonhardt-Bailey (2003) proceeds in a similar fashion, namely by employing Kalt and Zupan’s (1990) approach (see above), when wishing to assess how decisions by British MPs in the nineteenth century are influenced by their own ideology and their principals’ interests.
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- 15.
Lijphart (1963) also proposes an agreement index when criticizing earlier work measuring the affinity of different member states in the UNGA. In his measure, abstentions are only considered as a partial disagreement (to be precise, they are counted only half).
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- 18.
- 19.
Interestingly enough, Alker (1964) in his study of the UNGA does not refer to Harris’s (1948) and precursor studies focusing on the US congress. Equally notable is that studies on the French Parliament have also seen early developments of specific tools to measure cleavages and their innovative application to answer specific research questions (see for instance MacRae 1967; Warwick 1977).
- 20.
- 21.
Heckman and Snyder (1997) provide a rational for using factor analysis relying on a linear probability model linking estimated ideal points with the likelihood of voting in favor or against a proposal. Both Ansolabehere et al. (2001) and Andrews (2002) use this approach in analyses focusing on the US Congress, respectively, the Russian Duma.
- 22.
Related is obviously Kam’s (2008) study.
- 23.
- 24.
The literature on the reasons why roll call votes are requested is still rather thin. Fennell’s (1974) study of why roll call votes are requested in the Argentinean Parliament is probably the earliest such study. More generally, one may distinguish between disciplining and two types of signaling motivations. The latter distinguish themselves by the fact whether the requesters’ voting or the voting of other actors is to be signaled to a particular audience. See Carrubba et al. (2008) for a more detailed discussion.
- 25.
I refrain from discussing here the rather extensive and specialized literature that had developed between the publication of Farquharson’s (1969) early study of sophisticated voting and Krehbiel and Rivers’s (1990) article, which constituted some sort of a death knell for this literature (a bibliometric analyses of Farquharson’s (1969) book clearly demonstrates this).
- 26.
Relatedly, Bütikofer and Hug (2008) show that strategic voting may be prevalent in parliaments other than the US Congress.
- 27.
Bütikofer and Hug (2010) proceed similarly to assess the relative positions of MPs in the two chambers of the Swiss Parliament.
- 28.
Portmann et al. (2012) use another approach to assess whether, as a function of the electoral system employed, MPs represent more or less well the voters’ preferences (see also Eichenberger et al. 2012). Similarly, Kaniovski and Mueller (2011) explore whether MPs in the EP represent well the voters’ preferences.
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Hug, S. (2013). Parliamentary Voting. In: Müller, W., Narud, H. (eds) Party Governance and Party Democracy. Springer, New York, NY. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4614-6588-1_8
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