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Unicast Service Provisioning

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Resource Allocation in Decentralized Systems with Strategic Agents

Part of the book series: Springer Theses ((Springer Theses))

Abstract

Most of today’s networks, called integrated services networks support the delivery of a variety of services to their users each with its own quality of service (QoS) requirements (e.g. delay, percentage of packet loss, jitter, etc.). As the number of services offered by the network and the demand for the services increase, the need for efficient network operation increases. One of the key factors that contributes to efficient network operation is the efficient utilization of the network’s resources.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    During the play of the game at each link \(l\in \mathbf {L}\), each user of link \(l\) learns the set of the other users competing for bandwidth at \(l\).

  2. 2.

    We consider only the s where \(|\mathcal G ^l|\ge 2\). If \(|\mathcal G ^l|=1\) and \(i \in \mathcal G ^l\), then \(t_i^l=0 \cdot 1\{x_i \le c_l\}+\frac{1\{x_i > c_l\}}{1-1\{x_i > c_l\}}\).

  3. 3.

    Therefore, when A and B (both) hold, then \(\frac{1\{A\}1\{B\}}{1-1\{A\}1\{B\}}\approx \frac{1}{0^+}\) is well defined and it becomes a large number.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Electrical and System Engineering, University of Pennsylvania, Walnut St, L475 Levine Hall 3330, Philadelphia, 19104, USA

    Ali Kakhbod

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  1. Ali Kakhbod
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Kakhbod, A. (2013). Unicast Service Provisioning. In: Resource Allocation in Decentralized Systems with Strategic Agents. Springer Theses. Springer, New York, NY. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4614-6319-1_3

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4614-6319-1_3

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  • Publisher Name: Springer, New York, NY

  • Print ISBN: 978-1-4614-6318-4

  • Online ISBN: 978-1-4614-6319-1

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