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Stages in the Evolution of Modern Humans

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Abstract

A convenient place to begin a brief history of the human lineage is with the placental mammals—hairy, sweaty, toothed, lidded, flap-eared four-limbed animals with lungs, four-chambered hearts and developed brains. They maintain a high constant body temperature. Their young are produced from embryos attached to the placental organ in the uterus and, after birth, are nourished by milk from mammary glands. The oldest fossil of a placental mammal, dated to c.125 Mya (million years ago), is a ‘dormouse-like creature’ 10 cm long.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    In biology, adaptation is a word used to describe both a process and its product. Adaptation is a process of natural selection (differential reproductive success of genotypes in a population) which produces adaptations. An adaptation is an unprecedented anatomical structure, physiological process or behavioural trait in a population of organisms which, at least in the short term, increases that population’s capacity to survive and reproduce.

  2. 2.

    Sarich, V.M., Wilson, A.C., 1967, Immunological Time Scale for Hominid Evolution. Science, 158, pp. 1200–1203.

  3. 3.

    The cause of this climate change is contentious. Starting with the northward movement of the Australian tectonic plate, there may have been a northerly movement of the connecting seaway between the Indian and Pacific oceans which then led to a flow of cold north Pacific water through to the Indian Ocean in place of warmer South Pacific water. A colder Indian ocean meant less evaporation and less rainfall over Africa. An alternative, perhaps complementary, explanation for the drying of east Africa at this time attributes it to the delayed buildup of northern hemisphere ice sheets following the closure of the Panama seaway and the loss of warm currents in the north Atlantic about 4 Mya.

  4. 4.

    Torey. Z., 1999, ibid. p. 34.

  5. 5.

    Torey, Z., 1999, ibid., p. 32.

  6. 6.

    In many circumstances cooperation can be thought of as a ‘technology’ for synergistically amplifying the capacities (sensory, physical and mental) of individuals.

  7. 7.

    Torey, Z., 1999, ibid., pp. 1–38.

  8. 8.

    Wills, C., 1998, Children of Prometheus: The Accelerating Pace of Human Evolution, Perseus, Reading, p.229; Donald, M., 1991, Origins of the Modern Mind: Three Stages in the Evolution of Culture and Cognition, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA.

  9. 9.

    The ‘radiator’ hypothesis suggests that the dramatic increase in brain size that occurred in Homo was facilitated (not directly caused) by the evolution of a radiator network of veins which relaxed the thermal constraints on overheating that previously kept brain size in check. See Falk, D., 1990, Brain Evolution in Homo: The ‘Radiator’ Theory, Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 13, pp.333–381.

  10. 10.

    Bronowski, J., 1973, The Ascent of Man, British Broadcasting Corporation, London, p. 26.

  11. 11.

    Tooby, J., and DeVore, I., 1987, The Reconstruction of Hominid Evolution through Strategic Modelling, In W.G. Kinzey (Ed.), The Evolution of Human Behavior: Primate Models, SUNY Press, Albany, New York.

  12. 12.

    D’Andrade, R.G., 1995, The Development of Cognitive Anthropology, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.

  13. 13.

    Stone tools 2.5 myrs old have been found in Israel and Pakistan, suggesting to Wills (1998, ibid.), that habilines also left Africa for Asia, and perhaps Eastern Europe, at least 2.5 mya, while climates were still mild.

  14. 14.

    McNeill, W.H., 1979, Plagues and People, Penguin, London.

  15. 15.

    Wrangham, R., Jones, J. H., et al.,1999, The Raw and the Stolen: Cooking and the Ecology of Human Origins, Current Anthropology, 40 (5), pp. 567–594.

  16. 16.

    Based on observation of many mammalian taxa, a low degree of sexual dimorphism is an indicator of monogamous mating behaviour.

  17. 17.

    Drives can be thought of as generalised instincts involving much-heightened perception and motivation. In comparison, most instincts exhibit as more specific behavioural patterns which may be elicited under certain circumstances. In the case of humans, two conditions must be fulfilled for actual acting out of instinctual behavioural patterns: relevant stimuli and the absence of other modes of regulating behaviour. Drives are extremely plastic in humans. For example, sexual and feeding drives do not tell the individual where to seek release or what to eat; specific behavioural responses to these drives are acquired through socialisation. See Berger, P., and Luckmann, T., 1966, ibid. p. 181.

  18. 18.

    Clark, M.E., 2002, In Search of Human Nature, Routledge, London, p. 130.

  19. 19.

    Because 250 myrs is the time it takes the solar system to revolve around the centre of the galaxy (the ‘galactic year’), we can speculate that there is a cloudy, Sun-dimming region which the solar system encounters for several million years once every revolution. If that is so, there is a possibility that the present epoch of ice ages might be the last for another 250 myrs.

  20. 20.

    Templeton, A., 2002, Out of Africa, Again and Again, Nature, 416 (6876), pp. 45–51.

  21. 21.

    Thorne, A., Grün, R., et al., 1999, Australia’s Oldest Human Remains: Age of the Lake Mungo 3 Skeleton, J. Hum. Evol., 36, pp. 591–612; Stringer, C., 2002, Modern Human Origins: Progress and Prospects, Phil. Trans. R. Soc. Lond. B, 357, pp. 563–579.

  22. 22.

    Donald, M., 1991, ibid.; Torey, Z., 1999, ibid., p. 36.

  23. 23.

    Deacon, T., 1997, The Symbolic Species: The Co-evolution of Language and the Brain, Norton, New York, p. 137.

  24. 24.

    Clark, M.E., 2002, p. 160.

  25. 25.

    The concept of emotions as strong feelings has weakened to the point where the two words are interchangeable. An operational distinction might be that a feeling is a private experience of an emotion, one that cannot be observed by anyone else.

  26. 26.

    Deacon, T., 1997, ibid., p. 163.

  27. 27.

    Cited by Clark, M.E., 2002, ibid., p. 150.

  28. 28.

    Clark, M.E. 2002, ibid., p. 150.

  29. 29.

    Damasio, A., 1999, The Feeling of What Happens; Body and Emotion in the Making of Consciousness, Harcourt Brace & Co., New York.

  30. 30.

    It needs to be stated clearly that while science has learned much about correlations between brain activity and having feelings, science cannot explain how a feeling is generated any more than it can explain how a gravitational force is generated. See Harnad, S., What is Consciousness? Letter to New York Review of Books, 23 June, 2005, p. 56.

  31. 31.

    In logic, induction is the process of generalising over multiple examples, commonly by emphasising similarities and ignoring differences between them. A percept is anything which can be identified and, in principle, named. A schema is a ‘super percept’ made up of multiple percepts in a stable relationship. Percepts tend to be abstractions from direct experiences. Concepts tend to be more abstract than percepts and language-based in a way that percepts are not.

  32. 32.

    Emotional memory is memory involving the implicit (probably unconscious) learning and storage of information about the emotional significance of events of particular types.

  33. 33.

    http://www.scaruffi.com/nature/emotion.htm (Accessed 10 Nov 2010).

  34. 34.

    The physiological component of emotion has been traditionally identified as activity in the autonomic nervous system and the visceral organs (e.g. heart and lungs) that it serves.

  35. 35.

    Peter, R.S., 1958, The Concept of Motivation, In R.F. Holland (Ed) Studies in Philosophical Psychology, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London and New York.

  36. 36.

    Chaisson, E., 2001, ibid., says ‘selection’ is a misnomer—there is no agent that ‘selects’. Selection is not so much an active force or promoter of evolution as a passive pruner of the unfit. A better term might be ‘non-random elimination’. The brain’s strategy is to try out ideas until one is found which is ‘emotionally fit’.

  37. 37.

    In biology, a signal is any behaviour that conveys information from one individual to another, regardless of whether it serves other functions as well.

  38. 38.

    Ekman, P., (Ed.), 1982, Emotion in the Human Face (2nd Ed.), Cambridge University Press, New York.

  39. 39.

    Deacon, T., 1997, ibid., p. 431.

  40. 40.

    Darwin, C., 1872, The Expression of the Emotions in Man and Animals, John Murray, London.

  41. 41.

    Averill, J.R.,1980, A Constructivist View of Emotion. In R. Plutchik and H. Kellerman (Eds.), Emotion: Theory, Research and Experience, Vol. 1. Theories of Emotion, Academic Press, New York, pp. 305–339.

  42. 42.

    Bates, E.L., Benigni, I., et al., 1979, On the Evolution and Development of Symbols, Academic Press, New York, p. 64.

  43. 43.

    There are a number of candidate lists of primary emotions (collectively grouped as ‘affect’) in the literature. For example, Robert Plutchik developed a theory showing eight primary human emotions; joy, acceptance, fear, submission, sadness, disgust, anger and anticipation, and argued that all human emotions can be derived from these. See Plutchik, R., 1980, Emotion: Theory, Research, and Experience: Vol. 1. Theories of Emotion, 1, Academic, New York.

  44. 44.

    Fromm, E. 1942, Fear of Freedom, Routledge & Kegan Paul, London; Berger, P., and Luckmann, T., 1966, The Social Construction of Reality: A Treatise in the Sociology of Knowledge, Doubleday, New York, p.165; http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Little_Albert_experiment (Accessed 19 Nov 2010).

  45. 45.

    Donald, M., 1993, Précis of Origins of the Modern Mind, Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 16 (4), pp.737–791.

  46. 46.

    Berger, P., and Luckmann, T,, 1966, ibid. p. 68.

  47. 47.

    Donald, M., 1993, ibid.

  48. 48.

    Dugatkin, A.L., 2000, The Imitation Factor: Evolution Beyond the Gene, Free Press, New York.

  49. 49.

    Donald, M., 1993, ibid.

  50. 50.

    Later we will note that a capacity to ‘pause’, not physically as here but while mentally modelling a behaviour sequence, is a necessary part of being able to ‘solve problems’. Learning to internalise behaviours which were previously physically observable is indeed a recurring feature of hominid evolution.

  51. 51.

    Dunbar, R., 1998, The Social Brain Hypothesis, Evolutionary Anthropology, 6 (5), pp. 178―190.

  52. 52.

    Donald, M., 1993, ibid.

  53. 53.

    Note that the word being used is ‘mimes’, not the better-known ‘memes’. Richard Dawkins defines a meme as ‘a unit of cultural transmission, or a unit of imitation.’ See Dawkins, R., 1989, The Selfish Gene, Oxford University Press, Oxford Meme is unsuitable for use here because mimes are non-verbal whereas memes can be verbal or non-verbal. Also, the emphasis when using ‘meme’ is on the spread of new concepts and behaviours through a population whereas mimetic actions are about communicating using known signs in a known way.

  54. 54.

    Words are themselves arbitrary combinations of the three dozen or so phonemes or units of vocalisation which humans utter.

  55. 55.

    Allott, R., 1989, The Motor Theory of Language Origin, Book Guild, Lewes.

  56. 56.

    Donald, M., 1993, ibid.

  57. 57.

    Bipedalism, it might similarly be noted, had also freed the hands for miming.

  58. 58.

    Donald, M., 1993, ibid.

  59. 59.

    Jaynes, J., 1976, The Origin of Consciousness in the Breakdown of the Bicameral Mind, Houghton Mifflin, Boston. Ch. 6.

  60. 60.

    Calvin, W.H., 1997, How Brains Think: Evolving Intelligence, Then and Now, Basic Books, New York, Ch. 5.

  61. 61.

    Nowak, M.A., Plotkin, J.B, and Jansen, V.A., 2000, The Evolution of Syntactic Communication, Nature, 404, pp. 495–498.

  62. 62.

    Schoenemann, P.T., 1999, Syntax as an Emergent Characteristic of the Evolution of Semantic Complexity, Minds and Machines, 9(3), pp. 309–346.

  63. 63.

    Jaynes, J., 1976, ibid., p. 57.

  64. 64.

    Dunbar, R., 1993, Co-evolution of Neocortex Size, Groups Size and Language in Humans, Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 16 (4), pp. 681–735.

  65. 65.

    Gellner, E., 1992, Plough, Sword and Book: The Structure of Human History, University of Chicago Press, Chicago; McNeill, W.H., 1980, The Human Condition: An Ecological and Historical View, Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ.

  66. 66.

    Donald, M., 1993, ibid.

  67. 67.

    Malinowski, B., 1944, A Scientific Theory of Culture and Other Essays, University of North Carolina Press, Chapel Hill.

  68. 68.

    Bickerton, D., 1996, Language and Human Behaviour, UCL Press, London.

  69. 69.

    Lyra, P., 2005, Review of José Luis Bermúdez: Thinking without Words, Psyche, 11(2), pp. 1–12.

  70. 70.

    The mental operation we call ‘imagination’ can be seen as mimesis without motor execution of the imagined acts.

  71. 71.

    Jaynes, J., 1976, ibid., p. 313.

  72. 72.

    http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Abductive_reasoning (Accessed 21 Nov 2010).

  73. 73.

    Turchin, V., 1977, The Phenomenon of Science, Columbia University Press, New York, Ch. 8.

  74. 74.

    Turchin, V., 1977, ibid., Ch. 8.

  75. 75.

    Bickerton, D., 1996, ibid., p. 172.

  76. 76.

    Berger, P., and Luckmann, T., 1966, ibid., p. 68.

  77. 77.

    White, L., 1959, The Evolution of Culture: The Development of Civilization to the Fall of Rome, McGraw-Hill, New York, p. 80.

  78. 78.

    Deacon, T., 1997, ibid.

  79. 79.

    Jaynes, J., 1976, ibid., p. 106.

  80. 80.

    Diamond, J., 1977, Guns, Germs, and Steel: The Fates of Human Societies, W.W. Norton and Co., New York, Ch. 1.

  81. 81.

    Small, M., 1993, Female Choices: Sexual Behavior of Female Primates, Cornell University Press, New York, p. 183.

  82. 82.

    An alternative, perhaps complementary, explanation for such over-developed features is that they are allometric by-products of increasing body size (see later discussion of allometry).

  83. 83.

    For a useful review, see Pigliucci, M., and Murren, C.J., 2003, Genetic Evolution and a Possible Evolutionary Paradox: Can Macroevolution Sometimes be so Fast as to Pass us by? Evolution 57(7), pp. 1455–1464.

  84. 84.

    Quoted (p.55) in Lieberman, P., 1984, The Biology and Evolution of Language, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA.

  85. 85.

    Godfrey-Smith, P., 2003, Between Baldwin Skepticism and Baldwin Boosterism, Ch.3 in Weber, B., and Depew, D., (Eds) Evolution and Learning: The Baldwin Effect Reconsidered, MIT Press, Mass. A species’ capacity for phenotypic plasticity under environmental change presumably reflects a past accumulation of genetic changes (mutations) which, until then, had been selectively neutral, i.e. neither adaptive nor maladaptive. Several authors have discussed whether the useful capacity to generate selectively neutral variation is itself open to selection, e.g. Conrad, M., 1983, Adaptability, Plenum Press, New York.

  86. 86.

    Odling-Smee, F.J., Laland, K.N., and Feldman, M.W., 2003, Niche Construction: The Neglected Process in Evolution, Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ.

  87. 87.

    http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Language_acquisition (Accessed 23 Nov 2010).

  88. 88.

    Pigliucci, M., 2005, Evolution of Phenotypic Plasticity: Where are we Going Now? Trends in Ecology and Evolution, 20(9), pp.481–486.

  89. 89.

    Darwin, C., 1871, The Descent of Man, and Selection in Relation to Sex (1st Ed.), John Murray, London, Ch. 5.

  90. 90.

    Lewontin, R.C., 1970, The Units of Selection, Annual Reviews of Ecology and Systematics, 1, pp. 1–18.

  91. 91.

    Brandon, R., 1990, Adaptation and Environment, Princeton University Press, Princeton.

  92. 92.

    Berger, P., and Luckmann, T., 1966, ibid., p. 68.

  93. 93.

    Ambrose, S.H., 1998, Late Pleistocene Human Population Bottlenecks, Volcanic Winter, and Differentiation of Modern Humans, Journal of Human Evolution, 34 (6), pp.623–651.

  94. 94.

    Ambrose, S.H., 1998, ibid. This is what sometimes happens with invading species that spread rapidly across a new environment. They differentiate into observably dissimilar ecotypes. The arrival of sparrows in North America provides an example.

  95. 95.

    Burroughs, W.J., 2001, Climate Change, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.

  96. 96.

    A contrary view, backed by some evidence, is that the Americas could have been settled by seafarers much earlier. See Burroughs, W.J., 2001, ibid., pp.207–217.

  97. 97.

    McNeill, W.H.,1979, Plagues and People, Penguin, London.

  98. 98.

    The Upper Palaeolithic, meaning the last part of the ‘old’ is best regarded as a time period, one lasting from c.40 kya till c.12 kya.

  99. 99.

    Childe, G., 1936/1981, Man Makes Himself, Moonraker Press, Bradford-on-Avon, England, p. 51.

  100. 100.

    Ardrey, R., 1966, The Territorial Imperative: A Personal Inquiry into the Animal Origins of Property and Nations, Atheneum, New York; Morris, D., 1967, The Naked Ape: A Zoologist’s Study of the Human Animal, Cape, London; Burnet, M., 1970, Dominant Mammal: The Biology of Human Destiny, Heinemann, Melbourne, p. 72.

  101. 101.

    Le Blanc, S., with Register, K. 2003, Constant Battles: The Myth of the Peaceful, Noble Savage, St Martin’s Press. London.

  102. 102.

    Lehmann, A., 2001, Exploring Patterns in Neuropsychology for Support for an Alternative Theory of Evolution, Glozel Newsletter 6.5, pp. 1–90

  103. 103.

    Le Blanc, S., with Register, K., 2003, ibid.

  104. 104.

    Polanyi, K., 1944/2001, The Great Transformation: The Political and Economic Origins of our Time, Beacon Press, Boston.

  105. 105.

    Glynn, I., 1978, The Food-sharing Behavior of Protohuman Hominids. Scientific American, 238, pp. 90–108.

  106. 106.

    Mellars, P., 1996, Symbolism, Language, and the Neanderthal Mind, In Mellars P., and Gibson, K., (Eds.), Modelling the Early Human Mind., McDonald Inst. Archaeol. Res., Cambridge, UK, pp. 15–32.

  107. 107.

    Mayr, E., 2001, What Evolution Is, Basic Books, New York, p. 252.

  108. 108.

    Earley, J., 1997, Transforming Human Culture: Social Evolution and the Planetary Crisis, SUNY Press, Albany; Koestler, A., 1970, The Ghost in the Machine, Pan Books, London, p. 277.

  109. 109.

    Frazer, J.G., 1922, The Golden Bough, Abridged Edition, Macmillan, New York.

  110. 110.

    Montagu, A., 1957, Man: His First Million Years, World Publishing Company, New York.

  111. 111.

    Russell, B., 1921, Analysis of the Mind, Allen & Unwin, London.

  112. 112.

    Russell then relents enough to say that, speaking broadly, it is our ‘verbal habits’ which crystallise our beliefs, and afford the most convenient way of making them explicit.

  113. 113.

    Turchin, V., 1977, Phenomenon of Science, Columbia University Press, New York, Ch. 8.

  114. 114.

    Turchin, V., 1977, ibid.

  115. 115.

    Fromm, E., 1942, Fear of Freedom, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, pp. 23–25.

  116. 116.

    McLuhan, M., 1962, The Gutenberg Galaxy: The Making of Typographic Man, University of Toronto Press, Toronto, p. 18.

  117. 117.

    Wilber, K., 1996, Up From Eden: A Transpersonal View of Human Evolution, The Theosophical Publishing House, Wheaton, p. 270.

  118. 118.

    Berger, P., and Luckmann, T., 1966, ibid.

  119. 119.

    I am reminded of the joke about the aristocrat who claimed that his ancestors’ family tree went back to the time when they lived in it.

  120. 120.

    Satisficing is Herbert Simon’s (1956) word for adopting a strategy which is ‘good enough’ when decision-making resources are limited, as they usually are, i.e. any strategy which yields adequate, albeit not optimal, results is acceptable. See Simon, H.A., 1956, Rational Choice and the Structure of the Environment, Psychological Review, 63 (2), pp. 129–138.

  121. 121.

    Griffiths, P.E., and Gray, R. D., 1994, Developmental Systems Theory and Evolutionary Explanation, Journal of Philosophy, 91, pp.277–304; Walker, B.H., 2008, Building Resilience: Embracing an Uncertain Future, The Alfred Deakin Lectures, Deakin University, Vic.

  122. 122.

    Formally, natural selection is the process of differential reproductive success of heritable variants of developmental systems due to relative improvements in their functioning.

  123. 123.

    The rich idea that the niche and the organism co-evolve is explored under the rubric of constructivism in the literature. See Odling-Smee, F.J., et al. 2003, ibid.

  124. 124.

    Thomas Huxley called this a process of ‘progressive adaptation’ but ‘progress’ is a problematic word, to be avoided when possible.

  125. 125.

    Conrad, M., 1983, Adaptability, Plenum Press, New York, p. 260.

  126. 126.

    Lewontin, R.C., 1978, Adaptation, Sci. Am. 239, pp. 156–169.

  127. 127.

    Gould, S.J., and Vrba, E.S., 1982, Exaptation—A Missing Term in the Science of Form, Paleobiology, 8 (1), pp.4–15. Gould and Vrba use the term exaptation rather than pre-adaptation on the grounds that exaptation has no teleological flavour of purpose. I prefer pre-adaptation as being more immediately understandable. There is no implication that the organism ‘knew’ in advance that some adaptation would acquire further utility at a later time. Cooption is another term for pre-adaptation.

  128. 128.

    Adaptability is the capacity to thrive and survive when the environment changes whereas evolvability is proactive, i.e. the entity has capacity to try something different in the absence of environmental change.

  129. 129.

    Dunn, E.S., 1971, Economic and Social Development: A Process of Social Learning, Johns Hopkins, Baltimore. Dunn’s terms (Ch.2) are adaptive specialisation and adaptive generalisation. Other terms for the same distinction are specific versus general evolution and cladogenesis (branching evolution) versus anagenesis (upward evolution). See also Rensch, B., 1959, Evolution above the Species Level, Columbia University Press, New York.

  130. 130.

    Adaptedness is an absolute measure of the capacity to survive and reproduce. Fitness is a relative (to others) measure of survival and reproductive success.

  131. 131.

    An organism’s plasmon is the aggregate of its cytoplasmic or extranuclear genetic material. A plastid, a specialised component organelle in a photosynthetic plant cell that contains pigment, ribosomes and DNA, serves specific physiological purposes such as food synthesis and storage.

  132. 132.

    Carroll, S.B., 2000, Endless Forms: The Evolution of Gene Regulation and Morphological Diversity, Cell 101, pp. 577–580. Structural genes are genes that code for polypeptides or other structural units of a cell.

  133. 133.

    ‘Selectively neutral’ means that organisms with these pre-adaptations were as reproductively successful as those without them.

  134. 134.

    Sometimes, because genes can have multiple effects, non-functional tissues can arise as by-­products of selection for some functional character. Unspecialised tissues can be formed as allometric ‘by-products’ and then be later coopted for new functions. Specialisation removes surplus unspecialised tissues which otherwise might have been available for moulding into generalised adaptations.

  135. 135.

    Gould, S.J., and Eldredge, N., 1977, Punctuated Equilibria: The Tempo and Mode of Evolution Reconsidered, Paleobiology, 3 (2), pp. 115–151. A common argument against gradualism is that forms with characteristics intermediate between orders or even families are essentially unknown.

  136. 136.

    Dunn, E.S., 1971, Economic and Social Development: A Process of Social Learning, Johns Hopkins, Baltimore, p. 57.

  137. 137.

    Gould, S.J., 1982, Darwinism and the Expansion of Evolutionary Theory, Science, New Series, 216 (4544), pp. 380–387.

  138. 138.

    Rensch, B., 1959, Evolution above the Species Level. Columbia University Press. New York, p. 71.

  139. 139.

    Rensch, B., 1959, ibid., p. 73.

  140. 140.

    Gould, S.J., 1966, Allometry and Size in Ontogeny and Phylogeny. Biol. Rev., 41, pp. 587–640.

  141. 141.

    Rensch, B., 1959, ibid., pp. 211–218;. See also Reiss, M.J., 1989, The Allometry of Growth and Reproduction, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.

  142. 142.

    For example, http://www.science.siu.edu/zoology/king/metapt.htm (Accessed 3 May 2006); Heyland, A., Hodin, J., and Reitzel, A.M., 2004, Hormone Signalling in Evolution and Development: A Non-Model System Approach, BioEssays, 27, pp. 64–75.

  143. 143.

    Shea, B.T., 1992, Developmental Perspective on Size Change and Allometry In Evolution, Evolutionary Anthropology, 1(4), pp. 125–134.

  144. 144.

    Agrawal, A., 2001, Phenotypic Plasticity in the Interactions and Evolution of Species, Science, 294, pp. 321–326.

  145. 145.

    Brantingham, P.J., 1998, Hominid–Carnivore Coevolution and Invasion of the Predatory Guild, J. Anthropological Archaeology, 17, pp. 327–353.

  146. 146.

    Haberl, H., 2002, The Energetic Metabolism of Societies Part II: Empirical Examples, Research And Analysis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology and Yale University.

  147. 147.

    Mayr, E., 2001.What Evolution Is, Basic Books, New York, p. 254.

  148. 148.

    Lakoff, G., and Johnson, M., 1980, Metaphors We Live By, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, p. 117.

  149. 149.

    Dawkins, R., 1989, The Selfish Gene, Oxford University Press, Oxford; http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Culturgen (Accessed 17 Dec 2010).

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Cocks, D. (2013). Stages in the Evolution of Modern Humans. In: Global Overshoot. Springer, New York, NY. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4614-6265-1_2

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