Abstract
The freedoms of assembly and association are mentioned as individual rights in various international legal documents. They are recognized as cornerstones of a functioning democracy, and much has been written about these rights as they are understood and pertain to western democratic societies. With the aim of expanding our understanding beyond the west, this chapter focuses on perspectives on protest held by persons living in 12 Middle Eastern countries. Given the diversity within and among these states, a brief comparative overview of their demographics follows a discussion of protest and freedom of assembly as global concepts. The wave of protests that recently occurred throughout the Middle East/North Africa (MENA) region is examined, as these protests are active examples of the thoughts shared by survey respondents. Analysis of the qualitative survey data collected from nationals of each state revealed that the majority of respondents are pro-protest (91 %). They view protest as a socially sanctioned right, a human right, and a moral responsibility. Men were more likely than women to portray protest is a moral responsibility. Persons with military service were more likely to view protest as a socially sanctioned right, while persons with no military service most often cited the goal of protest as peace. Seventy-five percent (75 %) of respondents were in favor of exercising pro-social agency in response to police violence against nonviolent protesters and gave examples of personal initiative, activism, and legal action as ways they would respond to the police in such instances.
Keywords
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.
Depending on the parameters one uses (i.e., geographic, religious, ethnic, linguistic, etc.), there are many ways to define the Middle East. The region is traditionally described as including Cyprus, Turkey, Egypt, the countries of the Arabian Peninsula, the countries of the Levant, and Iran. Other definitions include the aforementioned countries, in addition to countries located in the North (Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya), West (Mauritania, Western Sahara), and East Africa (Sudan, Eritrea, Djibouti, Somalia). However, this chapter highlights the perspectives on protest held by persons living in the following 12 countries: Turkey, Lebanon, Israel, Jordan, Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Qatar, Oman, Iran, and Afghanistan. Given the diversity within and among these states, a brief comparative overview of their demographics, along with an analysis of the data collected from nationals of each state, will be provided following a discussion of protest and freedom of assembly as global concepts.
Protest and Freedom of Assembly
To protest is to object to or oppose something. The act of protesting can be executed singly by an individual or collectively by a group. Most often, protests take the form of demonstrations, strikes, and marches carried out by groups of people who come together with the goal of sending both a verbal and visual message for or against a social cause. During times of chaos created by political crisis, economic instability, war, etc., societies experience social movements. Social movements are organized responses to political and socioeconomic conditions by groups of persons who feel excluded, harbor a sense of unfairness, and feel unable to pursue satisfactory resolutions to their perceived problems (Tarrow, 1994). More importantly, social movements are composed of what Sidney Tarrow (1994) called “waves of protest,” which are meant to promote social change. For these reasons, the notion of protest is intrinsically linked to freedom of assembly.
Freedom of assembly is recognized as a cornerstone of a functioning democracy. It is mentioned as a right – along with freedom of association – in various international legal documents. Some of these documents include the United Nations’ International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, the American Convention on Human Rights, the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, the Basic Laws governing the residents of Hong Kong, and the Bill of Rights in the United States Constitution (UN Secretariat for the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, 2006); The Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the People’s Republic of China; The French Penal Code, Title III; Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms; and Article 40.6.1 of the Irish constitution also states that people have the freedom to assemble. However, these documents emphasize that citizens only have the right to defend their freedom in a peaceable manner. The Irish constitution has a clause forbidding assembling with arms, thus becoming a “nuisance to the general public” (Constitution of Ireland, 1999).
The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) joins the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) in adding other distinctions to their guidelines on freedom of peaceful assembly. A peaceful assembly is recognized as such when its organizers are deemed to have peaceful intentions. Further, peaceful assemblies held in public spaces that are not structures or buildings raise particular regulatory issues. OSCE-ODIHR (2007) points out that protests held indoors pose different ethical, security, and logistical concerns from those held outdoors.
Socialization, Conceptions of Protest, and the Freedom of Assembly in the Middle East
According to Albert Bandura’s theory on moral disengagement/engagement, people adopt moral standards that influence whether or not they take action during socialization (Bandura, 1999). Most experts agree that socialization is a lifelong process, during which a person learns how to participate in society. In essence, it is through socialization that one becomes a “creature of society” (Chafetz, 1978a). Moreover, many social factors influence human development, making it more possible to understand individuals by examining their environment (Bronfenbrenner, Alvarez, & Henderson, 1984). It can be inferred that the opinions of participants who provided responses for this study’s survey have been impacted by occurrences in their society, along with events that have taken place throughout the Middle East region.
In many respects, the countries from which our Middle East respondents hail are similar, yet there are noteworthy differences. The Freedom House “Freedom in the World Report: 2011” (Puddington, 2011, Sect. 3 box) is useful in that it classifies states into three categories based on political rights and civil liberties either enjoyed by or denied to their residents. The three categories identified by Puddington (2011, Sect. 3 box) are free, partly free, and not free. A free country is one “where there is open political competition, a climate of respect for civil liberties, significant independent civic life, and independent media.” A partly free country is one “in which there is limited respect for political rights and civil liberties,” where residents often must endure an environment of ethnic and religious strife, corruption, and weak rule of law. Although pluralism exists to an extent, a single political party frequently dominates. Finally, a not free country is one in which basic civil liberties are systematically denied and there is an absence of basic political rights. According to the Freedom House analysis, overall, the Middle East was the region with the fewest free countries (just one) and came in second only to Sub-Saharan Africa in regard to the number of countries not free. Sub-Saharan Africa has 19 such countries and the Middle East has 13 (Freedom House, 2011).
Regional Outlier: Israel
Israel’s population of 7.4 million has a 97% literacy rate and a per capita income of $29,800 (CIA World Factbook, 2011). The country is the only parliamentary democracy in the Middle East region. It is also the only proclaimed Jewish state and the only Middle Eastern state classified as free. Israel is party to the Universal Declaration on Human Rights (UDHR), the United Nations International Convention on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), and the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW). While there is no state constitution, in March 1992, the Knesset (parliament) passed the Basic Law on Human Dignity and Liberty, which was meant to guarantee the human rights of all people in Israel. However, the government has been criticized because the Basic Law’s terminology is vague and makes no mention of freedom of assembly. The government has been further criticized for passing in July of 2011 what has been called the “Boycott Law.” It states, “any boycott against Israel, including those organized by groups inside its territory and in the West Bank, will be deemed a civil offense, such as libel or defamation” (Sanders, 2011). For opponents, the Boycott Law is a direct infringement on the right of the people to protest. In Freedom House’s estimation, the people of Israel’s political rights and civil liberties have “suffered a decline due to a series of laws and policies that posed threats to freedom of expression and civil society” (Freedom House, 2012).
Between the Arab World and Europe: Lebanon, Kuwait, and Turkey
Freedom House classified Lebanon, Kuwait, and Turkey as partly free. Despite the fact that all three countries are predominantly Muslim, Lebanon and Kuwait are the most similar. Both are republics with small populations and high literacy rates, although Kuwait has a much higher per capita income (Lebanon: four million people, 87% literacy rate, $14,400 per capita income; Kuwait: 2.6 million people, 93% literacy rate, $48,900 per capita income) (CIA World Factbook, 2011). Both countries have promulgated constitutions that guarantee its citizens’ rights, and both are party to the UDHR, ICCPR, and CEDAW, in addition to being members of the Organization of the Islamic Conference (now known as the Organization of Islamic Cooperation – OIC) and the Arab League. In 1990, Lebanon and Kuwait adopted the Cairo Declaration on Human Rights in Islam (CDHRI). This was OIC’s attempt to make clear the human rights of all persons living in OIC member states. Made clear also was the fact that OIC views one’s rights as coming from God, a perspective endorsed in Shari’a (Islamic) law. Critics declared that the CDHRI limited freedom of religion, freedom of expression, and rights of women and non-Muslims (IHEU, 2008). When the Arab League adopted the Arab Charter on Human Rights in 1994, Lebanon and Kuwait accepted all parts of the Charter, including Part II, Article 28, which states, “all citizens have the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and association. No restrictions shall be placed on the exercise of this right unless so required by the exigencies of national security, public safety or the need to protect the rights and freedoms of others” (Council of the League of Arab States, 1997).
The language used in the Charter was direct. Yet, in 2007, the Egyptian Organization for Human Rights (EOHR) felt it necessary to launch a project “aimed at reinforcing the legal framework for the freedom of assembly and association in the Arab world through national dialogue and empowering civil society” (Fadl, 2010, para. 4). With the support of the Friedrich Naumann Foundation for Liberty and the European Union, EOHR’s 3-year project culminated in a report analyzing freedom of assembly and association in Egypt, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, and Syria, among other nations. The Arab League also hosted a 3-day conference in February 2010 in an effort to develop a document addressing freedom of assembly and association (Fadl, 2010). Representatives from civil society groups throughout the Arab world (including Lebanon and Kuwait), various international organizations, and the European Union attended the conference.
Turkey straddles the European and Arab worlds – geophysically, socially, and legally. A republican parliamentary democracy, it has a population of 78 million, a literacy rate of 87%, and per capita income of $12,300 (CIA Factbook, 2011). Like Lebanon and Kuwait, it is party to the UDHR, ICCPR, and CEDAW and is a member of OIC. It is not, however, a member of the Arab League. Rather, it belongs to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), setting it apart from all other Middle Eastern countries. Further illustrative of its close ties to Europe, in 1964, Turkey became an associate member of the European Community and began accession member talks with the European Community in 2005. It is a member of the European Council and the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR). As such, the Turkish government accepts and extends to its citizens all rights guaranteed per the legal documents associated with its membership in these organizations. More specifically, Turkey accepts all that is outlined in the European Union Charter of Fundamental Rights, which states the following in Article 12: “Everyone has the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and to freedom of association at all levels, in particular in political, trade union and civic matters, which implies the right of everyone to form and to join trade unions for the protection of his or her interests” (EU Charter, 2004). In addition, Articles 33 and 34 of the Turkish constitution explicitly state that the people of Turkey have freedom of assembly and freedom of association (Hensler, Overson, & Muller, 2005).
A Disparate Lot: Afghanistan, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Bahrain, Oman, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia
The seven remaining countries have two characteristics in common: they are all Muslim majority nations and they were all classified as “not free” by Freedom House. Afghanistan and Iran have governments that are based on religion. Afghanistan is an Islamic republic and Iran is a theocratic republic. Neither is a member of the Arab League nor is Iran a party to CEDAW. Due to Afghanistan’s turbulent political past and the wars it has experienced, the Afghan people are among those with the lowest regional literacy rate (28%) and per capita income ($900); this has been detrimental, especially when Afghanistan’s population size is taken into consideration (29.8 million) (CIA Factbook, 2011). In 2001, a plan was put into motion for reconstructing the state politically, which included adopting a constitution. The constitution that emerged from this process allowed Afghans to enjoy the freedom of association and freedom of assembly only if they do not bear arms and do not have violent intentions. Owing to its unique history of political violence, ethnic animosity, and social divisions, militaristic organizations are strictly prohibited. Finally, persons who plan to contradict or defy the Islamic religion are denied their rights of association and assembly completely. This last characteristic of the Afghan constitution puts it in good stead with its Iranian counterpart, which states the following in Article 27: “Unarmed assemblies and marches may be freely organized, provided that no violation of the foundations of Islam is involved” (Iran Chamber Society, 1979). Thus, in both Afghanistan and Iran, freedom of association and freedom of assembly are dependent upon deference to Islam. At the same time, Iran’s overall population (77 million) and per capita income ($10,600) make it most similar to Turkey economically, while the fact that its economy is oil-based puts it in line with the oil-producing Gulf States (CIA Factbook, 2011).
Iraq and Jordan are both republics with similar per capita incomes (Iraq: $3,800; Jordan: $5,400) (CIA Factbook, 2011). Jordan has one of the smallest economies in the Middle East and a small, yet very literate population (6.5 million; 89% literacy rate) compared to the population of Iraq (30 million; 74% literacy rate) (CIA Factbook, 2011). Both are members of the Arab League and signatories to ICCPR and CEDAW. Iraq is party to the UDHR while Jordan is not. Citizens of Iraq and Jordan enjoy the freedoms guaranteed under the CDHRI and the Arab Charter on Human Rights since their governments adopted both. For Iraqis, these freedoms are in addition to the freedom of “assembly and peaceful demonstration” guaranteed under Article 38 of their state constitution, which was promulgated in 2005. The text reads as follows:
The State shall guarantee in a way that does not violate public order and morality:
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(a)
Freedom of expression using all means.
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(b)
Freedom of press, printing, advertisement, media and publication.
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(c)
Freedom of assembly and peaceful demonstration, and this shall be regulated by law. (United Nations Assistance Mission in Iraq, 2005)
Articles 15(i) and 16 of the Jordanian constitution guarantee Jordanians the freedom of opinion and the right to hold meetings, which could be interpreted loosely to include the freedoms of both assembly and association.
Bahrain stands alone as the region’s only constitutional monarchy, defined as a governmental system “in which a monarch is guided by a constitution” that details in written law or by custom the rights, the monarch’s duties, and responsibilities (CIA, n.d., entry 9). The country is small with a tiny population (1.2 million) that reaps many benefits from the fact that its economy is based on the nation’s oil reserves. Bahrainis enjoy a per capita income that is comparable to that of citizens in western democratic countries ($40,300 annually) and a high literacy rate (86.5%) (CIA Factbook, 2011). Although Bahrain is not party to the UDHR and the ICCPR, it has ratified CEDAW and is a member of the Arab League. Article 28 of the Bahraini constitution guarantees all persons in Bahrain freedom of assembly, making a distinction between private and public assemblies. Meetings held in the private sphere (homes, etc.) do not appear to be regulated by the government. Meanwhile, any assemblies that take place in the public sphere are regulated by laws and seemingly subjective moral judgments that are most likely based on Islamic (religious) mores. The people of Bahrain also derive their rights to freedom of assembly and association from the CDHRI and the Arab Charter on Human Rights.
Oman, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia are oil-rich nations governed by absolute monarchs. None of them are signatories of the UDHR or the ICCPR, yet all have ratified CEDAW and all are members of the Arab League. Citizens of each country are granted the rights described under the CDHRI and the Arab Charter on Human Rights as well as those outlined in their respective constitutions. Oman’s constitution, which was promulgated in November 1996, guarantees its three million citizens (CIA Factbook, 2011) “the right of assembly within the limits of the Law” in Article 32 (Sultanate of Oman Ministry of Information, 2002). This is in addition to Article 29, which guarantees the “freedom of opinion and expression, whether spoken, written or in other forms…within the limits of the Law” (ibid). With a literacy rate of 81% and per capita income of $25,600, the Omani populace resembles that of Saudi Arabia far more than the Qatari populace (CIA Factbook, 2011).
Article 44 of the constitution of Qatar acknowledges, “the right of the citizens to assemble is guaranteed in accordance with the provisions of the law” (Qatar Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2007). Qatar’s 848,016 citizens (CIA Factbook, 2011) also have the freedom to establish association in accordance with the law per Article 45. Experts speculate that Qatar’s educated (89% literacy rate) and rather passive populace can be attributed to the fact that Qataris have the world’s highest per capita income ($179,000) and little reason to revolt (CIA Factbook, 2011; Weingarten, 2011). On the other hand, Saudi Arabia’s 26 million citizens (CIA Factbook, 2011) enjoy a high per capita income ($24,200) and literacy rate (78%), yet they must contend with a vaguely worded state constitution that leaves the power of interpretation of all outlined rights up to the Saudi government.
Adopted by royal degree in March 1992, the Saudi constitution is based solidly on the religion of Islam. For example, Article Seven declares that the “government in Saudi Arabia derives power from the Holy Koran and the Prophet [Mohamed’s] tradition,” while Article Six states that “citizens are to pay allegiance to the King in accordance with the holy Koran and the tradition of the Prophet, in submission and obedience” at all times (Saudi Arabia Constitution, 2011). Interestingly, Article 26 determines that the state will protect the human rights of Saudi citizens in accordance with Islamic Shari’a law. Nonetheless, nowhere in the constitution’s 83 articles are the freedoms of assembly and association mentioned. In fact, Article 12 seems to serve as a warning against any form of protest, stating that “the consolidation of national unity is a duty, and the state will prevent anything that may lead to disunity, sedition and separation” (ibid). It is fathomable that the monarchy could easily deem any form of opposition or protest as an action that could cause “disunity, sedition and separation,” and thereby move to suppress it.
Clearly, there is great diversity among the Middle Eastern nations in regard to such characteristics as income, education, type of government, variations in constitutional law, and adherence to those laws. What views on the right to protest were held by citizens of our selected Middle Eastern countries in the second half of the first decade of the twenty-first century, in the last few years before the “Arab Spring”? Did they tend to believe that citizens do have a right to participate in antiwar and other protest activities? What basis did they see for such a right?
Methods
Sample
The Middle Eastern sample consisted of respondents from Afghanistan, Bahrain, Iraq, Iran, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and the United Arab Emirates. There were a total of 743 codeable units from 431 respondents (217 females, 210 males, and 4 unidentified gender). Ages of respondents ranged from 18 to 81, with an average age of just over 30 years. Thirty percent had served in the military. Sixteen percent had a relative who had served or currently was serving in the military. Twenty-nine percent of the sample had taken part in a protest for peace and against war.
Procedure
The Personal and Institutional Rights to Governmental Aggression and Peace Survey (PAIRTAPS; Malley-Morrison, Daskalopoulos & You, 2006), created by the Group on International Perspectives of Governmental Aggression and Peace, included two items pertaining to protest. For the first item, “individuals have the right to stage protests against war and in favor of peace,” participants were first asked to rate their level of agreement with the statement and then explain the reasoning behind their rating. The second item was, “police are beating peaceful antiwar demonstrators. What would you want to do?” Grounded theory and deductive qualitative approaches were used to create coding manuals for these responses, which were first broken down into codeable units. Many responses contained multiple codeable units. For example, a 23-year-old Israeli man wrote, “every citizen has the right to have his voice heard in legitimate ways, yet the protest does not necessarily get heard.” This young man both affirms the right to protest, but also acknowledges that in the real world, rights do not always get respected. For more information regarding the protest coding manual, refer to the introductory chapter of this section on protest, Chap. 12.
The Right to Protest
Coding Procedure
Coding categories were initially derived through deductive qualitative analysis informed by Albert Bandura’s theory of moral disengagement. Bandura’s theory helps to explain how individuals rationalize immoral behavior in order not to feel that they are behaving immorally. Although many individuals may be highly moral in most walks of life, they may also find ways to detach themselves from the ethical implications of particular situations and behaviors, and thereby detach themselves from facing the consequences of their own immoral behavior or the behavior of others (Bandura, 1999). While the categories were developed based on his constructs of moral disengagement and engagement, we used the more neutral language of anti-protest (protest intolerant) and pro-protest (protest tolerant) in naming our coding categories in order to avoid reifying those constructs or implying that one group is more morally disengaged or engaged than another.
Working with an international coding manual sample, we identified four sets of categories in responses regarding an individual’s right to protest: (a) anti-protest (protest intolerant), (b) pro-protest (protest tolerant), (c) indeterminate status, and (d) focus on perceived reality. The major anti-protest coding categories are (a) pseudo-moral reasoning, (b) negative labeling, (c) disadvantageous comparison, (d) denial of personal responsibility, (e) distorting consequences, (f) dehumanization, (h) attribution of blame, and (i) general rejection of the right. Several of these categories had subcategories. The major pro-protest coding categories, several of which included subcategories, were (a) social justification, (b) moral responsibility, (c) humanization, and (d) general affirmation of the right. The perceived reality coding categories included (a) general focus on perceived reality, (b) right may not be respected, and (c) protest is futile. Finally, the two major indeterminate status categories were (a) depends and (b) do not know.
Distribution of Responses Across Thematic Categories
Anti-protest Sentiments
In response to the prompt regarding a person’s right to protest against war and in favor of peace, 4% of all of the responses were coded for protest-intolerant viewpoints. Protest-intolerant responses indicated that protesting was a negative way to express antiwar feelings or that protesting should not be allowed in general. The most frequently coded anti-protest argument was pseudo-moral reasoning, which represented 33% of the anti-protest responses and 1% of all the responses. Typical responses in this category expressed a desire to protect the government’s right to engage in war without being affected by protestors. The response of a 29-year-old woman from Israel summed up this point when she indicated that protesting in favor of peace and against war is a right “to a certain extent as long as they do not act against the government.” Thus, in her view, protesting can be an acceptable form of expression, but the government should be allowed to make decisions without taking differing viewpoints into consideration.
The second most common type of anti-protest response fell into the category of distorting consequences, representing 1% of all responses and 42% of anti-protest responses. Responses in this category exaggerated the negative consequences of protest as a way or rejecting the right to protest. For example, a 32-year-old woman from Jordan stated that “protests lead to shaking the security of the country.” Table 16.1 provides more examples of the anti-protest coding categories as well as basic demographic information.
Pro-protest Sentiments
Eighty-nine percent of all responses to the right to protest item endorsed that right. Although all of the coding categories were identified in responses, only categories that included 5% or more of the total responses are discussed here.
Sixteen percent of the entire response set and 18% of the pro-protest responses were coded for socially sanctioned rights – that is, they described protest as being a right because it is officially recognized or embedded in code of rights. A 28-year-old Lebanese man said, “the freedom of speech is a basic right provided for in the declaration of human rights, and in most constitutions, the said right is completed by the right to protest against war and in favor of peace.” A 19-year-old Lebanese woman commented, “because we are in a democratic country every individual has the right to express his opinion.”
The second most common pro-protest responses were those that referenced human rights, which accounted for 15% of all responses and 17% of the pro-protest responses. These responses stated or implied that protest is a right not just because some society says so but because it is inherent in humanity. A 30-year-old man from Afghanistan said, “yes, everyone has this right to be against war and always call for peace.”
Moral responsibility accounted for 10% of the total responses and 11% of pro-protest responses. Responses coded for moral responsibility spoke to the moral obligation of citizens to protest when governments take actions that citizens disagree with. Responses that demonstrated a moral responsibility to protest can be summed by the response of a 35-year-old woman from Jordan who said that “individuals have the right to express their opinions, even if no one listens to it they should not give up hope.” Subcategories of moral responsibility with a significant number of responses included the subcategory of nonviolent protest, which accounted for 9% of pro-protest responses and 8% of all responses, and it is a civic duty to protest (7% of the total and 7% of pro-protest responses). Responses coded into the subcategory of nonviolence indicate that protest is a right as long as it is peaceful. This view is typified by a response from a 59-year-old individual from Saudi Arabia who said that “this is a fundamental right of human expression as long as it is carried out by peaceful means sans violence.” Civic duty responses are typified in the following response given by a 22-year-old Afghan man: “Yes, politicians are corrupt, we as commoners should protests against what is not right.”
Social justification accounted for 5% of all the responses and 6% of the pro-protest responses. These types of responses asserted that the freedom to protest helps to create positive change and allows the world to be a better place. A 22-year-old Jordanian man responded, “so they live in security and safety.” The subcategory of peace constituted 10% of all responses and 11% of the pro-protest responses. A 28-year-old Lebanese woman said protest is a right because “of course, everyone wants to live in peace.” Table 16.2 provides more examples of the pro-protest coding categories, as well as basic demographic information.
Indeterminate Reasoning
Six percent of all responses to the question of whether an individual has the right to protest against war were coded as indeterminate status, a category designed to capture two types of responses: (a) I do not know or (b) it depends.
Exploratory Statistical Analyses of Right to Protest Responses
To examine the possibility of group differences in types of responses, chi-square analyses were run. The demographic variables that we analyzed were (a) gender, (b) military service, (c) relative’s military service, and (d) participation in peace protest. We followed standard statistical convention and consider any difference with a p value of 0.05 or less as statistically significant and any p value of 0.10 or less as marginally significant.
At a marginally significant level, proportionately more men than women held that protest is a person’s moral responsibility. In regard to military service, a significantly greater proportion of respondents without military service than their counterparts cited peace as the goal of protesting. A significantly greater proportion of civilian respondents than military respondents stated that protesting is a socially sanctioned right. No other significant or marginally significant group differences were found. Table 16.3 provides chi-square results and percentages of responses by demographic item for these analyses.
Police Beating Peaceful Protestors
Coding Procedure
The coding categories for the responses were taken from Bandura’s theory of moral disengagement. His theory attempts to explain people’s willingness to tolerate and even support violence due to different models of displacement or dehumanizing the victim. Bandura explains that people selectively use their moral agency in order to make peace with actions that are taken by detaching themselves from the responsibility of these actions (Bandura, 2004).
Responses to the question regarding an individual’s reaction to police beating peaceful protesters were coded into four major sets of categories: (a) pro-social agency, (b) anti-social agency, (c) lack of agency, and (d) indeterminate status (again with categories for do not know and it depends).
The major coding categories for pro-social agency included (a) judgment of police, (b) personal initiative, and (c) institutional initiative. These categories had various subcategories. The major coding categories for anti-social agency included, (a) support for police, (b) unlawful activism, and (c) against the demonstrators. The major coding categories for lack of agency included (a) lack of initiative and (b) helplessness.
The coding categories for indeterminate status were discussed in the section above.
Distribution of Responses Across Thematic Categories
Pro-social Agency Responses
Pro-social agency was demonstrated in 75% of responses to the question, “Police are beating peaceful antiwar demonstrators. What would you want to do?” Only responses accounting for 6% or more of the total responses will be discussed here.
The largest number of responses was coded for personal initiative, which accounted for 29% of all responses and 39% of the pro-social responses. The response of an Israeli woman was typical of this category when she said she would want to “stop it and punish the policemen.”
The second most represented category was activism, a subcategory of personal initiative, which represented 19% of the entire response set and 25% of pro-social responses. Generally, responses in this category showed support for the right to protest against the government and to take public action to create peace. A 26-year-old Afghani woman summed up the subcategory of activism by saying that she would “protest against it.”
Legal action accounted for the next largest percentage of pro-social category responses, representing 8% of all responses and 10% of pro-social responses. A 25-year-old Turkish man responded by saying that he would “go to the legal system and seek rights.”
The category of judgment of police accounted for 10% of pro-social responses and 7% of all responses. Such responses were typified by a Bahrain respondent who said that “it is not a right for the police to hit because they (the protestors) want security and peace in the country (Table 16.4).”
Anti-social Agency Responses
Anti-social agency was demonstrated in 10% of the responses to the scenario of police beating peaceful protestors. Only the anti-social agency categories that represented 2% or more of the responses will be discussed here.
Unlawful activism was the most frequently coded anti-social category, accounting for 7% of all responses and 74% of anti-social responses. Such responses are summed up by those who said they would “strike back,” as a 28-year-old Israeli man did.
The next largest category within anti-social agency was support for the police, which represented about 2% of the total response set and 17% of the anti-social response set. Such responses are typified by a Qatar respondent who simply said, “support [the police].”
Table 16.5 provides more examples of the coding categories discussed above as well as basic demographic information.
Lack of Agency
Responses that demonstrated an inability to assist either side were coded for lack of agency, which accounted for 14% of all responses. Many lack of agency responses were coded into the category lack of initiative and said (as a 28-year-old Israeli woman did) that they “would do nothing.” This subcategory accounted for almost 10% of all responses and 71% of lack of agency responses. Helplessness accounted for almost 4% of all responses and 29% of responses that were categorized as lack of agency. A 32-year-old Iraqi expressed a feeling of helplessness by saying that he “can’t do anything.”
Exploratory Statistical Analyses
To examine the possibility of group differences in types of responses, chi-square analyses were run. The demographic variables that we analyzed were (a) gender, (b) military service, (c) relative’s military service, and (d) participation in peace protest. We followed standard statistical convention and consider any difference with a p value of 0.05 or less as statistically significant and any p value of 0.10 or less as marginally significant.
Several statistically significant and marginally significant differences in responses to the police beating scenario were found based on military service and having a relative in the military. At a marginally significant level, a greater proportion of women than men proposed forms of unlawful activism in their responses to the item regarding police beating antiwar protestors. In regard to military service, a significantly greater proportion of respondents with military service than their nonmilitary counterparts gave (a) at least one response characterized by pro-social agency; (b) expressed an intent to exercise personal initiative, such as generally trying to end the beatings; and (c) indicated a desire to take legal action against the police. Conversely, a significantly greater proportion of respondents who had never been in the military than respondents who had been in the military provided reasoning that was coded into one or more of the lack of agency coding categories. Furthermore, a significantly greater proportion of nonmilitary respondents than military respondents showed a lack of initiative to act in response to the beatings, but interestingly, the nonmilitary respondents also mentioned activism, such as protesting the beatings, as something they would want to do. A significantly greater proportion of respondents without a military relative than their counterparts provided responses coded into the pro-social agency categories, along with displaying personal initiative to end the beatings
In regard to protesting, protestors were marginally more likely than non-protestors to give responses coded into one or more of the pro-social agency categories, as well as responses demonstrating unlawful activism. A significantly greater proportion of non-protesting respondents than protesting respondents gave responses coded into one or more of the lack of agency and anti-social agency categories. Furthermore, non-protestors were marginally more likely than their counterparts to show a critical judgment of the police and a lack of initiative.
Table 16.6 provides chi-square results and percentages of responses by demographic item for the coding categories above.
Discussion
The Arab Spring and the Power of Protest
…people from Tunisia and Egypt to Bahrain and Iran [are] asserting their right to protest….
Joe Stork, Deputy Director, Middle East Division, Human Rights Watch
The events that have occurred in the Middle East in the past 2 years have bolstered the importance of this chapter. No one could have imagined that what began as a protest in Tunisia in December 2010 against a government the people long felt was oppressive and irresponsive to their needs was just the beginning of an unprecedented wave of protests that would take the world by surprise. More importantly, that protest altered the political, social, and economic landscapes of various countries throughout the Middle East/North Africa (MENA) region. The protests, which have collectively become known as the “Arab Spring” in the English language press and the “Arab Revolutions” among Arabic speakers, have, to varying degrees, affected each of the 12 countries included in the sample for this chapter. However, it is the small group of countries not included in this sample, yet located in the MENA region, whose protests have had the greatest impact.
Leaders Be Gone: Change Driven by Youth (Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, and Yemen)
The population of the MENA region is young, as “more than two-thirds of the region’s population is under the age of 25” (Davies, 2011, para. 1). Given the long tenures in office that most MENA leaders have traditionally maintained, many Middle Easterners and North Africans have known only one leader for their entire lives. It was the social solidarity displayed in youth-led protests, nevertheless, that resulted in the removal of Tunisia’s Zine El Abidine Ben Ali, Egypt’s Hosni Mubarak, Libya’s Muammar Gaddafi, and Yemen’s Ali Abdullah Saleh. Their departures occurred like a domino effect. Ben Ali fled to Saudi Arabia in January 2011, less than 1 month after a 25-year-old street vendor set himself ablaze and died in protest of the strong-arming he received at the hands of the police because he refused to pay bribes (Gardner, 2011). Ben Ali did not leave office because the vendor died; he left because Tunisians from all walks of life violently protested in response to their fellow citizen’s treatment, simultaneously expressing their own discontent with the government. The raw anger that was unleashed and the boldness with which the protests were staged made Ben Ali fear for his life.
On February 11, 2011, it was announced that Mubarak had stepped down after having been in office for just shy of 30 years, earning him the nickname “Egypt’s Last Pharaoh” (Elaasar, 2009). The 82-year-old leader was incredulous that protesters refused to leave Tahrir Square in downtown Cairo and demanded nothing less than his immediate ouster. The resolve of the people is embodied in a quote from a man named Islam, whose brother had been killed protesting:
I will not leave the square. Over my dead body. I trust the army, but I don’t trust those controlling the army behind the scenes. Down with corruption and repression. This is a new day of freedom. I have tasted freedom and I will not turn back. (Reuters, 2011)
In the end, Mubarak surrendered to the pressure exerted from 18 days of intense physical and electronic (online) protests he never thought Egyptians capable of orchestrating.
Gaddafi ruled Libya for a decade longer than Mubarak ruled Egypt and nearly two decades longer than Ben Ali headed the Tunisian government. Even those most optimistic for change had given up on the idea of Gaddafi ever leaving office, since there had been so many thwarted attempts to remove him in the past (Vandewalle, 2012). Put simply, the man seemed invincible – that is, until Gaddafi had human rights activists teargassed, beaten, arrested, and killed by plain-clothes state agents solely because they were organizing the Libyan people for a “Day of Anger,” with public peaceful demonstrations scheduled for February 17, 2011 (Human Rights Watch, 2011). Protests quickly escalated to a full civil war that ended in the brutal beating death of Gaddafi in his hometown. The once indomitable leader’s demise was captured on video and subsequently broadcasted around the world (Sheridan, 2011). He pleaded for his life before a merciless crowd too tired of having their rights trampled upon for decades to consider his.
Arguably, the situation in Yemen was more desperate than in any of the other countries in the MENA region. President Saleh had held office for 32 years, essentially ruling over a highly controlled police state. Yemen’s demographics partly explain Saleh’s success. It is “the poorest country in the Arab world” (Genocide Watch, 2012, para. 2), with a per capita income of $2,500 and an estimated 35% unemployment rate (CIA World Factbook, 2011). Moreover, competition between systems of tribal governance and centralized national leadership has resulted in social divisions (Al-Dawsari, 2012). Demonstrations began in January 2011. The crowds of protestors continued to swell in numbers and intensify in anger in response to violent government suppression throughout the months leading up to a failed assassination attempt against Saleh on June 3, 2011 (Jamjoon & Almasmari, 2011). After fleeing to Saudi Arabia, Saleh signed a Gulf Cooperation Council Agreement in which he conceded stepping down from office. Vice President Abd al-Rab Mansur al-Hadi won the February 21, 2012 presidential election, and Saleh left office on February 27, 2012.
The Unseen Future on a Newly Beaten Path
The launch of the Arab Revolutions was just the beginning. The nations of the MENA region are now grappling internally with how to create their own futures. In October 2011, Tunisians elected a pro-human rights president and a prime minister from a moderate Muslim party (Sherwood, 2012). The next task the Tunisian National Constituent Assembly addressed was the promulgation of a new constitution, which was still being drafted in May 2012 (Hassine, 2012).
Libya’s national transitional council, led by Prime Minister Abdurrahim al-Keib, is responsible for guiding the country from the chaos of civil war to democratic stability. There is still much violence between various factions vying for power and testing the legitimacy of the transitional government. At the same time, Libyans “are increasingly exercising their freedom of speech and have a strong desire to be consulted on national issues [coupled with] a determination to hold their leaders accountable” (Lederer, 2012, para. 6). United Nations representatives believe that Libya is making positive strides quickly, highlighting the fact that more than one million people have registered to vote for a national congress in June 2012 (UN News Center, 2012).
Despite sporadic sectarian and religious violence following the dawn of what Egyptians call the “White Revolution,” there is an unmatched sense of exuberance among the people. One man articulated the feelings of many of his countrymen and women when he stated, “now we have our freedom and can breathe and demand our rights. In Mubarak’s era, we never saw a good day. Hopefully now we will see better times” (Blair & Nakhoul, 2011, para. 5). This is a very decisive time in the history of the Egyptian state, and its progress toward free elections is likely to have bearing on the three regions bordering Egypt: Africa, the Middle East, and Asia.
Like Tunisia, Yemen held elections in February 2012 and undertook the process of drafting a new constitution. Unlike Tunisia, however, the prerevolution Yemeni state remained vulnerable to persisting insurgent-instigated violence. Al-Qaeda linked Islamists and others engaged in daily battles with government forces and tribes allied with the military (Human Rights Watch, 2012). Presidential and parliamentary elections were scheduled to take place again in 2014. It is possible that Yemen could be drawn into civil war well before then, due to offenses launched mostly from southern-based antigovernment forces that are believed closely linked to Islamist networks operating throughout the Persian Gulf and East Africa (Anzalone, 2011).
Conclusion: Socially Sanctioned Rights and Pro-social Agency Responses
The Tunisian people acted on a firm belief that to protest is a socially sanctioned right. It was the vendor’s right to express peacefully his objections to how he was treated by the police (the state). At the same time, it is clear by their actions that thousands of Tunisians agreed with members of this chapter’s sample when they exercised their pro-social agency in response to the police beating of the vendor (the protestor). By taking to the streets and engaging with the media despite being aware that they risked harsh repercussions from the government, Tunisians proved that it is erroneous to underestimate any groups’ support for protest as a means for change – even if they live in societies where protests have not been historically supported, or have been violently suppressed. One needs only to look at Egypt, Libya, and Yemen for evidence. Further, it is also incorrect to assume that persons who may not have the courage to initiate protest on their own would lack the courage to react to police brutality against those who dared to protest. In other words, people who may personally harbor anti-protest sentiments may simultaneously exercise pro-social agency in response to perceived injustice against others who express/exercise pro-protest sentiments.
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Scruggs, N. et al. (2013). Perspectives of Protest in the Middle East. In: Malley-Morrison, K., Mercurio, A., Twose, G. (eds) International Handbook of Peace and Reconciliation. Peace Psychology Book Series, vol 7. Springer, New York, NY. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4614-5933-0_16
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