Abstract
The phrase “smart grid” refers to an interactive network (including physical facilities and software tying together consumers, the distribution system, and the bulk power system) designed to improve the efficiency of electric utility system operations while empowering consumers to make cost-conscious decisions about the services they desire. Proponents assert that smart grid assets and programs will yield information valuable to utilities, consumers, and third-party providers of new products and services.
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- 1.
For a variety of definitions of “smart grid,” see S. Lichtenberg, Smart Grid Data: Must There Be Conflict Between Energy Management and Consumer Privacy?, NRRI 10–17 (Dec. 2010), available at http://www.nrri.org/documents/317330/04fba250-b3ee-420b-86c2-14ef6ba8a948.
- 2.
The United States has three interconnections: The Eastern Interconnected System, the Western Interconnected System, and the Texas Interconnected System. These three systems are not synchronized with each other. See http://www.eia.doe.gov/electricity/page/prim2/chapter7.html.
- 3.
The Electric Power Research Institute has estimated the smart grid’s cost at $165 billion over a 20-year period. Smart Grid News, “Sticker Shock: EPRI Says Smart Grid Will Cost $165 Billion Over 20 Years.” http://www.smartgridnews.com/artman/publish/Business_Policy_Regulation_News/Sticker-Shock-EPRI-Says-Smart-Grid-Will-Cost-165-Billion-Over-20-Years-1882.html (Feb. 15, 2010, accessed Jan. 4, 2011). No estimate can be authoritative, given the many unknowns and undecideds concerning purposes, hardware, programming, and operations.
- 4.
The number “52” comes from 50 states plus the District of Columbia and the City of New Orleans (which acts as the regulator of retail electric service within the city).
- 5.
The Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007, Pub. L. 110–140, included Title XIII, addressing the Smart Grid.
- 6.
“The U.S. grid, which is operated by over 3100 electric utilities using equipment and systems from hundreds of suppliers, historically has not had much emphasis on standardization and thus incorporates many proprietary interfaces and technologies that result in the equivalents of stand-alone silos.” See G. Arnold, National Leadership Toward an Interoperable Smart Grid—A Progress Report, at http://www.electricitypolicy.com/Arnold-12-30-10.pdf.
- 7.
National Broadband Plan, at 268, http://www.broadband.gov/download-plan/, Chapter 12.
- 8.
Id.
- 9.
Id. at 269.
- 10.
Id., Recommendation 12.6.
- 11.
Id., Recommendation 12.8.
- 12.
Id., Recommendation 12.11.
- 13.
The FCC is obligated to create a “plan for use of broadband infrastructure and services in advancing[,]” among other things, “energy independence and efficiency.” American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111–5, § 6001(k)(2)(D), 123 Stat. 115, 516 (2009) (Recovery Act). But that obligation to write a plan does not grant the FCC authority to order other actions to advance that goal, or any of its other general goals.
- 14.
For important insights on the growth in the universe of subjects addressed by state commissions, and some of the legal struggles arising from that growth, see E. Filipink, Serving the “Public Interest: Traditional vs. Expansive Utility Regulation,” NRRI 10–02 (Dec. 2009).
- 15.
See National Association for the Advancement of Colored People v. Federal Power Commission, 425 U.S. 662 (1976) (“public interest” phrase in the Federal Power Act did not authorize Federal Power Commission to issue a rule prohibiting racial discrimination by utilities). Yet the FCC has pursued diversity in employment in and ownership of jurisdictional facilities. See, e.g., Metro Broadcasting v. Federal Communications Commission, 497 U.S. 547 (1990).
- 16.
National Broadband Plan at 265.
- 17.
Id. at 266.
- 18.
National Broadband Plan, at 268.
- 19.
National Broadband Plan at 268.
- 20.
Id. at 270.
- 21.
Id. at 265.
- 22.
Id. at 270.
- 23.
Id.
- 24.
FERC has found that when a transmission-owning utility joins an RTO, thereby transferring functional control of its transmission assets to the RTO, transmission service becomes “unbundled.” The jurisdictional effect is to make the transmission costs FERC-jurisdictional rather than state-jurisdictional. For additional detail, see W. Steinhurst, “The Electric Industry at a Glance,” Published by the National Regulatory Research Institute, at Part III, available at http://nrri.org/pubs/electricity/electricity_at_a_glance.pdf. Part III was authored by the present author.
- 25.
Even a traditional retail utility is required to provide “Order 888” transmission service to others.
- 26.
This section draws from the author’s essay “Low Rates, High Rates, Wrong Rates, Right Rates,” available at http://www.nrri.org/, Monthly Essays, January 2009.
- 27.
See Garry Wills, Uncertain Trumpets: The Nature of Leadership (2007).
- 28.
This section draws from the author’s essay, “Utility Performance: Will We Know It When We See It?” available at http://www.nrri.org/, Monthly Essays, August 2010.
- 29.
For more on this problem of resource gaps, see the author’s two essays on “Regulatory Resources: Does the Differential Make a Difference?” at http://www.nrri.org/, Monthly Essays, October 2008 and November 2008.
- 30.
See Strauss, Schwarz and Lippman, Are Utility Workforces Prepared for New Demands? Recommendations for State Commission Inquiries, NRRI 10–01 ((Jan. 2010) at 28–38, available at http://www.nrri.org/pubs/multiutility/NRRI_graying_jan10-01.pdf.
- 31.
See the author’s essay “Commissions Are Not Courts; Regulators Are Not Judges” at http://www.nrri.org/, Monthly Essays, February 2008.
- 32.
Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. United Airlines, Inc., 948 F.2d 536, 542 (9th Cir. 1991).
- 33.
Hecht v. Pro-Football, Inc., 570 F.2d 982, 992 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
- 34.
Id.
- 35.
National Broadband Plan at 265.
- 36.
Id. at 270.
- 37.
Id. at 272.
- 38.
J. Genachowski, The Third Way: A Narrowly Tailored Broadband Framework (May 6, 2010).
- 39.
This section is drawn from S. Hempling and T. Stanton, Smart Grid: How Can State Commission Orders Produce the Necessary Utility Performance? (presented to the NARUC-FERC Smart Grid Collaborative in November 2010), available at http://www.nrri.org/documents/317330/85d7530f-3ea8-4e40-bd7b-eead22d8c14.
- 40.
For a detailed discussion of this question, see S. Lichtenberg, Smart Grid Data: Must There Be Conflict Between Energy Management and Consumer Privacy? NRRI 10–17 (Dec. 2010), available at http://www.nrri.org/documents/317330/04fba250-b3ee-420b-86c2-14ef6ba8a948?version=1.1.
- 41.
See National Institute of Standards and Technology, Guidelines for Smart Grid Cyber Security (Sept. 2010) http://www.nist.gov/smartgrid/.
- 42.
Natl. Assn. Reg. Util. Commrs, Resolution on Smart Grid, July 2010.
- 43.
Id.
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Hempling, S. (2013). Broadband’s Role in Smart Grid’s Success: Seven Jurisdictional Challenges. In: Noam, E., Pupillo, L., Kranz, J. (eds) Broadband Networks, Smart Grids and Climate Change. Springer, New York, NY. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4614-5266-9_8
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