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Political Decision in a Game Theory Approach

  • George M. Korres
  • Aikaterini Kokkinou
Chapter
Part of the Innovation, Technology, and Knowledge Management book series (ITKM, volume 28)

Abstract

Neoclassical approach is based on the importance of the information problems in order to determine the inter-sequential behavior of agents and the necessity of considering the state as a major player in the strategic game. Using the hypothesis regarding the agents’ rationality, we can examine the optimum way of using the information available at a certain moment in order to make decisions.

Keywords

Game Theory Public Choice Decision Theory Economic Agent Security Level 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media New York 2013

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Centre of Urban and Regional Development Studies (CURDS)University of NewcastleNewcastleUK
  2. 2.Department of GeographyUniversity of AegeanMytileneGreece
  3. 3.Department of EconomicsUniversity of GlasgowGlasgowScotland, UK

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