Abstract
In April 2009, the Russian Counter-Terrorism Committee announced the halting of terrorism operations in Chechnya and the anticipated withdrawal of some of the 20,000 MVD stationed there. Irrespective of the reliability of the data, there is no doubt that fighting between Russian forces (assisted by their local allies) and insurgent forces continue.
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Notes
- 1.
Unidentified Author, “Counter-terrorism ends in Chechnya,” RIA Novosti, April 4, 2009, available at http://en.rian.ru/russia/20090416/121156568.html (Accessed February 20, 2012).
- 2.
Author Unidentified, “Medvedev outlines anti-terrorism strategy for North Caucasus,” RIA Novosti, April 4, 2010, available at http://en.rian.ru/russia/20100401/158395373.html (Accessed February 22, 2012).
- 3.
Strategia social’no-economisheskogo razvitia Severo-Kavkaxskogo Federal’nogo Okruga do 2025 [Strategy of Social-Economic Development of the North Caucasian Federal District until 2025], approved by Presidential Directive № 1485-r of the Government of the Russian Federation, September 6, 2010.
- 4.
The authors of the Strategy might have benefited from examining the “blueprint” advanced by Valery Tishkov, Director of the Institute of Ethnology and Anthropology of the Russian Academy of Sciences. See Tishkov 2001. Professor Tishkov takes the position that the war was an intra-state conflict motivated by a desire for Chechen separatism where ethnic factors played an important role. He proposes a post-conflict reconstruction plan developed to account for the causes of the conflict, history, social factors—that is, reconstruction can be successful only if the reasons for the violence are taken into account. See Id., at 62–64.
- 5.
- 6.
The Kremlin was probably more flexible in its negotiations with Tatarstan, since unlike the Northern Caucasus, it does not share borders with foreign countries. The text of the original 1994 Agreement between the Government of the Russian Federation and the Government of the Republic of Tatarstan “On Delimitation of Authority in the Sphere of Foreign Economic Relations” is available on the Tatarstan website at http://www.kcn.ru/tat_en/tatarstan/agree.htm. In subsequent years, various issues arose concerning Tatarstan’s rights within the Russian Federation; a revised Agreement between the parties was renewed in October 2005 which enshrined Tatarstan’s autonomy in various areas. Christopher Williams, “Tatar nation building since 1991: Ethnic mobilization in historic perspective,” Journal of Ethnopolitics and Minority Issues in Europe, Vol. 10, No. 1, at 94-123, (2011), available at http://www.ecmi.de/fileadmin/downloads/publications/JEMIE/2011/Williams.pdf (Both Accessed May 1, 2012).
- 7.
During the Second Chechen War, both sides undertook a considerable effort to generate public support through the mass media. See Herd 2000. They maintain websites to justify their actions, spread disinformation, and engage in cyber conflict. There is a multitude of academic, news, and governmental websites. In addition, there are many organizations that maintain websites such as the Chechen Kavkaz-Tsentr (kavkaz.ru). Not to be overlooked are VKontakte.ru, Odnoklassniki.ru, and Facebook which provides individuals and organizations with opportunities to disseminate views and establish personal networks.
- 8.
See Ware and Kisriev 2010. The expansion of the conflict beyond Chechnya particularly after 2005 in light of the ethnic and political diversity of the region must not be overlooked. For example, Ware and Kisriev note that the Soviets “formally recognized fourteen different ethnic groups” in Dagestan. Diversity extends far beyond ethnic or national groups, which in many cases are mere labels. There are numerous cleavages, such as urban/rural, income, level of religious observance, political beliefs, and other personal circumstances. Id., at 39–87.
- 9.
See Vatchagaev 2012 (perhapsoffering an illustration of the interplay of the domino effect with “decapitation.”).
- 10.
- 11.
According to one study, approximately 90 % of the ethnic Russian population has fled Chechnya since the Soviet Union’s break-up. See Vendina 2007. This article places considerable emphasis on the economic forces contributing to the “commercialization” of the conflict, in particular how criminal groups have benefitted from the region’s economic difficulties and the breakdown of societal order. The outmigration of Russians and others (particularly skilled professionals) has created economic opportunities for some that have remained. Id., at 182–197. See Annex which discusses the ethnic composition in the Northern Caucasus.
- 12.
Unidentified Author, “Russian Terror Crimes Down by 50 % in 2011—FSB Chief,” RIA Novosti, February 15, 2012, available at http://en.ria.ru/russia/20120215/171325101.html (Accessed February 20, 2012).
- 13.
NAC’s Website is available at http://nak.fsb.ru/; see Presidential Edict № 116, “O merakh po protivodeistviiu terrorismy” [“On Measures for Counterterrorism]”, February 15, 2006, available at http://nak.fsb.ru/nac/documents/ord_law.htm (Accessed February 20, 2012). This Edict approved the formation of a committee to coordinate federal, regional, and local law enforcement bodies engaged in counter-terrorism activities.
- 14.
Dzutsev 2012a. Many specialists rely on the website Kavkaz Uzel (Caucasian Knot) for a broad range of views on the situation in the Caucasus. Caucasian Knot seeks “to ensure free access to truthful and non-engaged information about events in the Caucasus; inform the Russian and global community about violations of human rights, situation in armed conflict zones, cases of ethnic or political discrimination and refugees' problems; and provide information support to promotion of civil initiatives and independent mass media. [It presents] actual data on the present-day life in the Caucasus… including materials [from] local mass media, documents and legislative acts, reference data… analytical reviews and comments, data on non-governmental organizations, political and public figures and regional mass media,” available at http://www.eng.kavkaz-uzel.ru/articles/AboutCaucasianKnot. The Russian language site is available at http://www.kavkaz-uzel.ru/ and the English language site is available at http://www.eng.kavkaz-uzel.ru/ (Both Accessed March 12, 2012).
- 15.
Unidentified Author, “Some 1,000 militants ‘still active’ in North Caucasus,” RIA Novosti, September 30, 2011, available at http://en.ria.ru/russia/20110930/167282370.html (Accessed February 20, 2012). According to Khloponin, the main factors contributing to the conditions in the Northern Caucasus are not ideological, political, or religious. Instead, he identified the causes as the “three main threats facing the region” as unemployment, poor housing, and substandard education. Unidentified Author, “Russian Envoy to Northern Caucasus names main regional problems, RIA Novosti, April 9, 2010, available at http://en.rian.ru/russia/20100409/158492411.html (Accessed February 21, 2012). See also Unidentified Author, “Medvedev says business investment should normalize situation in Caucasus,” RIA Novosti, April 1, 2010, available at http://en.rian.ru/russia/20100401/158397257.html (Accessed February 20, 2012).
- 16.
See e.g. Dzutsev 2012b (discussing the shooting down of a Russian military helicopter, apparently without any casualties and a suicide bombing in which five policeman were killed and two wounded), available at http://www.jamestown.org/programs/nca/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=39123&tx_ttnews%5BbackPid%5D=24&cHash=1d87f305364966730a485ec4da6469d2 and (Both Accessed March 14, 2012).
- 17.
Vatchagaev 2011.
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Burger, E.S., Cheloukhine, S. (2013). Conclusion and Final Observations. In: Counterterrorism in Areas of Political Unrest. SpringerBriefs in Criminology(). Springer, New York, NY. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4614-5140-2_6
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