Abstract
During the first wave of concession bargaining, occurring in the 1980s, employers were reacting to the pressures of global competition, domestic nonunion competition, and deregulation by insisting that unions lower labor costs. New collective agreements frequently had wage cuts or freezes, changes in work rules, and reduced pensions. Concession bargaining became widespread in the airlines (among the older, legacy carriers losing in their competitive battles with the low-cost carriers) and in domestic auto making, and then spread to other industrial sectors. The first wave of concession bargaining eroded the foundations of the labor accord (the accommodation underlying the relationship between unions and employers), freeing employers to incite the ultra-concession bargaining that would appear around the turn of the next century.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Notes
- 1.
Some (e.g., Schiavone 2008; McCartin 2011) continue to argue that the breaking of the strike by air traffic controllers in 1981 (the PATCO strike) by President Reagan signaled to employers that antiunion extremism was entirely appropriate and effective, and that this example led directly to the concession bargaining of the 1980s. However, there is no evidence of any causal linkage between the defeat of the PATCO strikers and changes in employer bargaining strategies and tactics or the intensity of their antiunion campaigns during organizing drives.
- 2.
For a bibliography of articles dealing with the early years of the first wave of concession bargaining, see Dworaczek (1984).
- 3.
- 4.
The legacy carriers were not able to compete with the low-cost carriers and the low-cost carriers kept their costs down by growing quickly. The low-cost carriers relied on point-to-point systems that did not integrate flights, instead focusing on low-cost traveling between sites. The legacy carriers used the hub and spoke system of operations under which passengers fly to hubs at major airports to connect to flights to their final destinations. This was a convenient way for traveling from small communities because it opened up worldwide routes, but it was 45 % more expensive than a point-to-point system (Chaison 2007).
- 5.
For an argument that the concessions negotiated at the automakers in the early 1980s set the trend for unions granting concessions see Slaughter (1983).
- 6.
For an overview of the relationship between the UAW and GM from the earliest days of organizing in the 1930s to the bankruptcy of GM in 2009, see de Gier (2010).
- 7.
For a review of the state of the UAW following the decline of the domestic car producers, see Seetharam and Korkki (2011).
- 8.
Some believed that the accord was neither entirely balanced nor pervasive. It was limited by geography (found mostly in heavily industrialized regions such as the Northeast) and by industry (primarily in manufacturing, mining, transportation, and construction). In these regions and industries, the workforce was so heavily unionized that employers had little to gain by resisting unions (Edwards and Podgursky 1986; Chaison and Bigelow 2002; Godard 2009). N. Lichtenstein, a major critic of the prevalence of the labor–management accord, wrote that the accord was “at best a brittle truce in which each side probed for weaknesses and division on the other side” (Lichtenstein 2011, 3). This critique is fully developed in Lichtenstein (2002, 98–140).
- 9.
As Marshall (2011, 2) described the basic understanding between labor and management: “workers offered loyalty and labor offered peace to companies in return for stable jobs and decent pay and benefits.”
- 10.
- 11.
As the accord unraveled so did workers’ loyalty to their employers. Many workers had thought that they would be rewarded for their efforts with long-term employment but after their unions agreed to concessions, they found that their assumptions about long tenure were being ignored by their employer and they could easily lose their jobs (Korkki 2011).
References
Bamber G J et al. (2009) Up in the air: How airlines can improve performance by engaging their employees. Cornell University Press, Ithaca N.Y.
Bell L (1989) Union concessions in the 1980s. Fed. Res. Bank of New York Quarterly Rev. 14: 44–58.
Bureau of National Affairs (1982) Labor Relations in an economic recession: Job losses and concession bargaining. Bur. of Nat. Affairs, Washington D.C.
Cappelli P, Harris, TH (1985) Airline union concessions in the wake of deregulation. Mon. Labor Rev. 108: 37–38.
Chaison G (2006) Unions in America. Sage, Thousand Oaks, CA.
Chaison G (2007) Airline negotiations and the new concessionary bargaining. J. Lab. Res. 28: 643–657
Chaison G, Bigelow B (2002) Unions and legitimacy. Cornell University Press, Ithaca, NY.
Chaison G, Plovnick M (1986) Is there a new collective bargaining? California Manag. Rev. 28:54–61.
Concessionary bargaining: Will the new cooperation last? (1982) Bus. Week. 14 June: 66-69, 72, 77–81.
Craypo C, Nissen B (1993) Grand designs: The impact of corporate strategies on workers, unions, and communities. ILR Press, Ithaca N.Y.
Curtin WJ (1986) Airline deregulation and labor relations. Monthly Lab. Rev. 109: 29–31.
Cutcher-Gershenfeld J, Kochan T (2004) Taking Stock: Collective bargaining at the turn of the century. Ind. and Labor Relat. Rev. 58: 3–26.
De Gier E (2010) Paradise lost revisited: GM and the UAW in historical perspective. Visiting fellow working papers. Paper 30 www.digitalcommons.ilr.cornell/edu. 1 September. Accessed 10 February 2012.
Dooley FJ (1994) Déjà vu for airline labor relations. J Labor Res. 15: 169–190.
Donn CB (1989) Concession bargaining in the ocean going maritime industry. Ind. Labor Rel. Rev. 42: 189–200.
Dworaczek M (1984) Labor concessions in collective bargaining: An article bibliography. Vance Bibliographies: Monticello, Ill.
Edwards R., Podgursky M (1986) The unraveling accord: American unions in crisis. In Edwards R et al. (eds) Unions in crisis and beyond: perspectives from six countries. Auburn, Dover MA.
Gifford C (2011) Directory of U.S. labor organizations. Bur. of Nat. Aff., Washington D.C.
Godard J (2009) The exceptional decline of the American labor movement. Ind. Labor Rel. Rev. 63: 82–108.
Henle P (1973) Reverse collective Bargaining: A look at some union concession situations. Indus. and Lab. Rel. Rev. 26:956–968.
Katz et al. (2002) Autos: Continuity and change in collective bargaining. In Clark PF, Delaney JT and Frost A (eds) Collective bargaining in the private sector. IRRA, Madison, WI: 55–90.
Kochan, TA (1986) The future of collective bargaining and its implications for labor arbitration. Sloan School of Management, Working paper 1787–86, MIT, Cambridge MA.
Kochan TA, McKersie RB(1982) Interpreting current developments in collective bargaining and industrial relations, Unpublished paper, Sloan School of Management, MIT: Cambridge MA.
Kochan T A, McKersie RB (1983) SMR Forum: Collective bargaining—pressures for change. Sloan Management Rev. 23: 59–65.
Korkki P (2011) The search: The shifting definition of worker loyalty. New York Times. 24 April: 8.
Lanoutte W J (1982) Recession brings labor-management closer on union contracts. National J. 6 March: 422–425.
Lichtenstein N (2002) State of the union. Princeton N.J., Princeton University Press.
Lichtenstein N (2011) The long history of labor bashing. The Chronicle of Higher Education, The Chronical Review, www.chronicle.com 6 March. Accessed 15 February 2012.
Marshall W (2011) Why labor needs a new deal for labor and business. The Atlantic www.theatlantic.com 4 September. Accessed 6 September 2011.
McCartin J (2011) The strike that busted unions. New York Times. www.nytimes.com 2 August. Accessed 2 August 2011.
Miner T (1982) Concession bargaining. Chicago-Kent Law Rev. 59: 981–996.
Mitchell DJB (1982) Recent union contract concessions. Brookings Papers on Econ. Activity 1: 165–201.
Mitchell DJB (1983a) Is wage determination at a turning point? Proceedings of the 35th Annual Meeting of the Indust. Rel. Res. Assoc.: 354–361.
Mitchell DJB (1983b) The 1982 union wage concessions: A turning point for collective bargaining. California Manag. Rev. 25: 78–92.
Mitchell DJB (1985) Concession bargaining and wage determination. Bus. Econ. 7: 45–50.
Nilsson EA (1997) The growth of union decertification: A test of two non-nested theories. Ind. Relat. 36: 324–348.
Rogers J (1993) Don’t worry, be happy: The postwar decline of private-sector unionism in the United States, in Jenson J, Mahon R. (1993) (eds) The challenge of restructuring. Temple University Press, Philadelphia: 48–71.
Salpukas A (1985) The two-tier wage impact. New York Times October 30:1.
Schiavone M (2008) Unions in crisis?: The future of organized labor in America. Praeger, Westport CT.
Slaughter J (1983) Concession bargaining in autos. Labor Res. Rev. 1:70–72.
Strauss G (1995) Is the new deal system collapsing: With what might it be replaced? Indust. Rel. 33: 329–349.
Townsend E. (1982) Unions grow reluctant to make concessions to troubled industries. Christian Science Monit. June 24:15.
Wilson M (1982) Big labor faces reality. Dun’s Bus. Mon. February: 37–42.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 2012 Springer Science+Business Media New York
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Chaison, G. (2012). The First Wave: Concession Bargaining in the 1980s. In: The New Collective Bargaining. SpringerBriefs in Economics. Springer, New York, NY. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4614-4024-6_3
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4614-4024-6_3
Published:
Publisher Name: Springer, New York, NY
Print ISBN: 978-1-4614-4023-9
Online ISBN: 978-1-4614-4024-6
eBook Packages: Business and EconomicsEconomics and Finance (R0)