Abstract
The old theme of “crime and punishment” is undoubtedly quite important for understanding so called (post)transitional societies. To begin with, the concept of “crime” has been used as a powerful ideological weapon in the extremely hurried process of destructively constructing a capitalist post-socialist society. The defunct “socialist” system has been unanimously condemned by victorious contra-revolutionary and bourgeois forces as a “totalitarian regime”, i.e. the “crime of all crimes”. Consequently, basic transitional experiences (e.g. denationalization, privatization, intimidation, the extortion and humiliation of the “work force” in its various forms, etc.) could be interpreted as a collective punishment for the abhorrent crime(s) of “socialism”. On the other hand, “crime” (encompassing various forms of predatory, fraudulent and corruptive activities) has functioned as a more or less “normal” means of accumulating capital, wealth and prestige and also for solving more trivial—material and “moral”—problems. Hence, the distinction between legitimate and illegitimate acquisitive activities or between illegally and legally “organized crime” has become increasingly blurred. However, it is essentially “structural violence” (e.g. unjustified inequalities, socially unnecessary heteronomous work, the growth of precarious jobs, irrational organisation of profit-oriented economy, ecological destruction, etc.) that is the most harmful phenomenon in actual political formations, determined, moreover, by a profound and manifold crisis in the global capitalist system. Also, what has become evident enough is not only the grotesque obsoleteness of the ruling capitalist ideology (and of its core cultural values), but its puzzling stupidity that could be described as a determining characteristic of the spirit of “our” dark, brain-dead, vertiginously accelerated post-modern times.
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- 1.
Sometimes, the term “transition” refers also to the societies/states that managed to break with military-led authoritarian regimes, generously supported by the USA (e.g. Argentina, Chile and other Latin American countries), or post-apartheid South Africa (see Klein 2009, pp. 171–257). However, the concept of “transition” could also be understood otherwise, for example as: (a) post-modernization (see Hardt and Negri 2003, pp. 120–133); (b) the transformation of “Fordist” (or industrial) capitalism and its regimes of (global or local) accumulation (see Virno 2003, pp. 83–100, Gorz 1999, pp. 27–32); (c) a structural crisis in the historical world system (i.e. the capitalist world economy) or the passage to some new system or systems (not necessarily better than the existing one). See Wallerstein (2004, pp. 223–226).
- 2.
For a critical view of capital as the “sole possessor of sovereignty” (Marco Revelli), see Gorz (1999, pp. 14–16).
- 3.
This attitude—clearly reflecting the deeply rooted feeling of inferiority towards the West (core states of capitalist world system)—cannot be described as something completely new (say as an emotional disposition which emerged suddenly after the death of “socialism”). On the contrary, it could be observed much earlier. Not only numerous “ordinary” working people but also their political and ideological avant-garde (leaders and members of Marxist–Leninist communist parties, including of course managers of social or state capital) showed quite often great respect (not rarely combined with envy) to the various economic achievements of their capitalist enemies or competitors. In this regard, there is really no break (or discontinuity) between socialist and “transitional” times. In addition, it has to be taken into account that “socialist” states were—despite their relative isolation (softened in many way as time passed)—parts/units of a world system determined strictly by brutal capitalist “logic” (and its functional “imperatives” accompanied with various structurally generated sanctions, i.e. rewards and punishments). See Wallerstein (1999, pp. 14–15). Moreover, “socialist” and capitalist social formations shared a firm, unshakable belief that endless economic growth should be treated as the most important developmental goal, indeed as the aim of all aims (crucial criterion for measurement, comparing or assessing their respective successfulness). See Hamilton (2007, p. 17). Besides, there were also many similarities at the “instrumental” level, e.g. the complex division of social labour, industrialization, “Fordist” regulation of basic societal relations and activities (including of course mass standardized production and consumption). Hence, it comes of no surprise that, in many regards, “socialist” societies looked like a caricature of their Western paragons. In the post-socialist transitional context the caricature merely became more accentuated, often to the point of being almost grotesque.
- 4.
Post-socialist transition is characterized by a seemingly curious explosion of anti-communism, in spite of the fact that there is really no communist threat left (since ex-communists—or rather once loyal members of the bygone ruling party—for the most part either evaporated or converted almost miraculously into democrats, liberals, conservatives, nationalists, defenders of human rights, ruthless managers, the money-hungry private owners of once “social” firms, inventive businessmen, bold entrepreneurs, successful traffickers in arms, financial magicians, influential lobbyists, public relation experts, value-freed academics, tireless propagandists of free-market economy, etc.). How could this paradox be accounted for? Well, quite easily, especially if we bear in mind that anti-communism is essentially a pro-capitalist ideology. Moreover, anti-communism is an extremely dangerous, even pernicious ideology. Think, for example, of McCarthyism, which destroyed numerous careers and lives of critics of capitalism. Pay regard to those who were intimidated into silence to retain their jobs. Give consideration to the overthrow of governments, suspended democracies, bloody military interventions, the installation of tyrannical right-wing dictatorships, normalized torture, systematic terror and many other more or less routine atrocities performed in defence of the business community, corporations, the capitalist class or a thin minority of super-rich (and their faithful clients). See Hunt (1990, pp. 176–180).
- 5.
Žižek (2009, pp. 428–439) distinguishes between three categories of “the commons” (Negri and Hardt 2003, 2010), i.e. “the shared substance of our social being whose privatization is a violent act and which should also be resisted with violence, if necessary”, namely: (a) the commons of culture (e.g. language, knowledge, infrastructures of transport, electricity, post, networks of communication, etc.); (b) the commons of external nature (e.g. oil, water, air, forests and the natural habitat itself); (c) the commons of internal nature (e.g. the biogenetic inheritance of humanity). According to Žižek, “It is this reference to ‘commons’—this substance of productivity which is neither private nor public—which justifies the resuscitation of the notion of communism. The commons can thus be linked to what Hegel, in his Phenomenology, deployed as die Sache, the shared social thing-cause, ‘the work of all and everyone’, the substance kept alive by incessant subjective productivity” (Žižek 2009, p. 429).
- 6.
- 7.
See Sennett (2008, pp. 108–118).
- 8.
For a critical view of prevailing Slovenian perceptions of “Europe”, see Mastnak (2001, pp. 10–15). The author points out that membership of EU implies transformation of the Slovenian (formally still a “sovereign”) state into a “province” or “region”, servile to the “dictatorship of European bureaucracy”. Referring to “Europe” has indeed functioned as a ready-made justification for introducing “unpopular” (but seemingly “necessary”) political and legal measures. Anyway, when the European Union’s icy institutional architecture, ideologically correct discourse and the impenetrable fog produced by unreadable, indigestible legal provisions are put into parentheses, the key message of its managing elites appears quite unambiguously. To put it very crudely: “You must work more, better and faster, you lazy, coddled pigs!”.
- 9.
For a detailed description of NATO’s secret terrorist activities (directed in the main against left-wing “internal enemies”) in Western Europe during the cold war (after the Second World War), see Ganser (2006).
- 10.
For a comprehensive analysis, see Žižek (2009, pp. 458–459).
- 11.
Put simply, “negative” or “formal” freedom means above all absence of external restrictions, so that one can do as one pleases (for one is left alone). For other meanings of this controversial concept (such as the ability to give rule or principle to one’s behaviour or realise one’s “genuine” or “real” self as an individual), see Geuss (2005, pp. 67–77).
- 12.
See Gorz (1999, pp. 52–54).
- 13.
- 14.
- 15.
However, that deplorable fact seems to be to a great extent obscured by the imported psychological doctrine of liberalism. For one thing, this sort of popular ideology defines the individual a priori as a free agent who must interpret what he does (or omits to do) and what happens to him as a “product of his own”, i.e. regardless of external circumstances, situational pressures, role (normative) expectations or manipulations. On the other hand, liberalism functions as a mode of legitimizing commands issued by bearers or performers of power in this or that institution, e.g. a family, school or economic/work organization. To be more specific, a “liberal” boss justifies orders given to structurally subordinated individual by referring to a worker’s “human nature”, “freedom of choice” or “authentic motivation”, e.g. his need of self-actualization, spiritual growth, self-development, intelligence or other “genuine personality trait”. See Beauvois (2000, pp. 155–159).
- 16.
Seen in the retrospect, it is motor-car fans who could be conceived as members of the most influential “civil” society movement in the socialist system, for it was their basic human rights (to a well-engineered car, fast-moving road and plentiful parking-places) that were implemented with extreme care, respect, haste and consistency (after the victory of “democracy”).
- 17.
For an interesting description of the consumerist inclinations of the Yugoslav party elite (with legendary president Tito in deserved first place), see Pirjevec (2011, pp. 191–199).
- 18.
What that designation implies is not only the ideologically camouflaged socialisation (or collectivisation) of the externalized cost of production (e.g. connected to pollution or unemployment caused by “work-saving” technologies or the “flight of the factories” to the “heavens abroad”) or rescuing corporations and investors who are “too big to fail”, but the fact that characteristically communist aims or ideals—first of all the reduction of socially necessary work and the national state’s power—are now pursued (and increasingly carried out) under the parasitic command of capital. Needless to say, the consequences of these processes are not only scandalous, but catastrophic. See Virno (2003, pp. 97–99).
- 19.
“Violations of normal exchange can be distinguished in the following way: Some threaten the very possibility of free exchange by depriving people of the ability to dispose of their property. Other violations threaten not the possibility of free exchange but its success in meeting the wishes of the exchangers. What threatens the very possibility of exchange are acts of violence that overtly block the capacity of individuals to exercise their wills, acts of theft that overtly bypass the capacity of individuals to choose how their property is disposed of, and acts of deception that have the same effect, so to speak, behind the backs of their victims. These are so serious that must be prevented in advance—and that requires a standing threat of punishment” (Reiman 1998, p. 208).
- 20.
“A few days before the Czech municipal and Senate elections, on October 16, 2006, the Ministry of the Interior of the Czech Republic banned the organization the Communist Youth League (KSM). What was its ‘criminal idea’ on account of which, according to the Ministry of the Interior, the KSM deserved to be banned? The fact that its program advocates the transformation of private ownership of the means of production into social property, thereby contradicting the Czech constitution … To claim that demand for social ownership of the means of production is a crime is to say that modern left-wing thought has criminal roots” (Žižek 2009, p. 404).
- 21.
See Močnik (2010, p. 178).
- 22.
See Hardt and Negri (2003, pp. 228–230).
- 23.
See Hobsbawm (2000, pp. 386–388).
- 24.
- 25.
“That much social control is supported today by mass media, however, does not mean that there is currently a greater ‘fragmentation’ and ‘indeterminacy’ of meaning than in the past. It is not even that clear that there is a ‘greater complexity’, if we take into account that the increasing centralization and standardization of the mass media is probably contributing to a reduction in the diversity of message-production […] In fact, in the actual interaction of everyday life, ‘fixations’ of meanings that are cogent and powerful, even if somewhat contingent, do happen and are strongly connected to the operation of mass media of communication” (Melossi 1997, p. 62). For a precise analysis of media manipulations in the “society of spectacle”, see Kara-Murza (2011, pp. 403–437).
- 26.
See Canfora (2006, pp. 321–324).
- 27.
As Scheerer and Hess have shown, in order to buy various symbolically (and emotionally) charged commodities, one must conform to the work ethic: “And the harder one works, the more one needs to compensate for everyday alienation in leisure time. But with all leisure time compensations being ever more linked to commodified reifications, one must be ready to sell one’s soul to the only system that both creates, shapes and—at least partially or virtually—fulfils these wants, thus making capitalism something like a latter day catholic church” (1977, p. 120).
- 28.
“Consumer culture has become like an arms race in that most consumption is defensive, an effort to avoid humiliation and the possible destruction of the self's fragile place in the vicious social process of identification” (Hall et al. 2008, p. 108).
- 29.
Ironically, one is supposed to accept (“internalize”) the capitalist system’s necessities (and contradictions) freely, i.e. as a formal owner of oneself. The paradoxical consequence of this coerced “freedom” (in objectively subordinated structural position or “role”) is quasi autonomous rationalization of one’s “liberal slavery”. See Beauvois (2000, pp. 192–204).
- 30.
See Kurz (2000, pp. 111–112).
- 31.
For a detailed analysis of the internal contradictions of the Keynesian project, see Bembič (2011, pp. 219–226). As the author has pointed out, it was Polish economist Michal Kalecki who, as early as in 1943, predicated the resistance of the capitalist class to the policy/imperative of full employment. In the article entitled Political Aspects of Full Employment, Kalecki argues that in the context of stable full employment dismissal from service/job cannot function as an efficient disciplinary measure. As a consequence, the social position of capitalist boss is weakened and the class consciousness of the proletariat is strengthened.
- 32.
For a thorough analysis of the “normalization” of crime in post-modern capitalism, see Lee (2002, pp. 134–160).
- 33.
The similarity between a business criminal and a more “conventional” (or ordinary) one has been already stressed by Veblen’s unforgettable assertion: “The ideal pecuniary man is like the ideal delinquent in his unscrupulous conversion of goods and persons to his own ends, and a callous disregard of the feelings and wishes of others and of remoter effects of his actions; but he is unlike him in possessing a keener sense of status, and in working more consistently and far-sightedly to a remoter end” (Veblen 2005, p. 75).
- 34.
As Hall et al. (2008: 191–213) have shown, much of contemporary property crime can be explained as being instrumental in nature, that is, as a means of acquiring the symbolism of conspicuous consumption (required to construct “imaginary solutions to imaginary problems”), without the ignominy of having to labour like anonymous and inferior members of the “herd”.
- 35.
For an excellent analysis of the expression of “amorphous negativism”, see Sloterdijk (2009, pp. 300–310).
- 36.
Of course, corruption is by no means a phenomenon exclusively characteristic of (post)transitional societies. On the contrary, political corruption is an altogether normal and, moreover, even indestructible attribute of the capitalist world economy (in this regard, see Wallerstein 2004, pp. 150–151). For an “anti-criminological” analysis of corrupt exchanges in Italy, France and Great Britain, see Ruggiero 2001, pp. 124–156. For a detailed description of institutionalized and legalized corruption in the USA, see Starikov (2011, pp. 63–83). Badiou (2008, pp. 89–91) even argues that corruption is to be understood as an essence of “democracy,” representing first of all the key interests (and functional imperatives) of capitalist economy, or indeed of any political system of which the central goals are private and collective enrichment, permanent economic “growth”, endless accumulation and the “untouchability” of the property of super-rich owners. On the other hand, according to Hart and Negri (2010, pp. 151–155), corruption must be interpreted as capital’s expropriation, segmentation, control and privatization of what is socially produced by common action and thinking. Corrupted forms of the “common” are also to be found in the most important social institutions of capitalist society, that is, in the family, corporation and nation.
- 37.
According to Machiavelli, the only remedy for corruption is as follows: “well-ordered republics” must “keep their treasuries rich and their citizens poor” (quoted in Skinner 2000, p. 80). What Machiavelli had in mind is above all a suggestion that body politic has to favour common and public wealth, while there has to be also a strict normative limit up to which individual citizens are permitted to accumulate private resources. Such a policy is surely based upon persuasive arguments. Moreover, it is what actual societies, envenomed by normalized corruption, really need. In other words, it is excessive private/privatized riches that have to be abolished (and its bearers shamed).
- 38.
If the right to self-determined death was consistently recognized, one could buy whatever means (at one’s choice) were necessary for this ultimate act. Additionally, one could realize it in a special, intimate setting, e.g. in a public suicidal house.
- 39.
For a classical elucidation of the term “leisure”, see Veblen (2005, pp. 21–23).
- 40.
Phillips also sees no reason why the right of inheritance should be allowed to continue: “If a renowned opera star, for instance, is entitled to his or her exceptionally high earnings, then it is not morally impermissible for this person to provide expensive sorts of food, a large house, or rare books, for his or her spouse and children. Nor is it objectionable that vast amounts of knowledge and information are passed on to the latter, even though these are the result of the parent’s privileged position. There is no justification, however, for the idea that the rich parent should also be entitled to pass on the vast wealth and holdings that he or she has accumulated” (1986, p. 431).
- 41.
It should be remembered that the expression “theft of the century” does not refer only to the criminal or unlawful acquisition of wealth and to the apparently legal but morally questionable “drainage” of companies by their leading managers (or “owners”). Moreover, it cannot be attributed merely to so-called tycoons (post-modern “robber barons and baroness”, as it were), i.e. to the select gang of the most successful, unscrupulous and money-hungry pillagers. No, the “theft of the century”—e.g. denationalization and privatization—has been perpetrated mostly according to the letter and the spirit of the law (in this sense it is the law itself that was and still is criminal, so to say). In other words, it was a collective, politically orchestrated project, based on widespread consensus and the indispensable support of experts (particularly lawyers). In Slovenia, for instance, privatization certificates were warmly accepted (like a sort of gift from heaven inviting everyone to transmigrate into the capitalist body), not to mention an exceptional opportunity to buy state-owned or social apartments at extremely low prices.
- 42.
For a critical analysis of the deceptive nature of advertising and the marketing “industry”, see Hamilton (2007, pp. 77–86). What is in this respect probably even more alarming, is the sad fact that one is exposed to subtle manipulation of this kind from as early as infancy: “Research recently carried out by the national Consumer Council (undated) led them to declare the existence of a ‘new shopping generation’, and the marketing industry continues to invent ever more ingenious methods of inculcating messages about consumer products into the psyches and cultural lives of young children. By the age of ten 78% of children list shopping as one of their favourite activities and they have been inducted to the world of brands and labels; the average child of this age displays extreme familiarity with 300–400 brands” (Hall et al. 2008, pp. 94–95).
- 43.
“The basis on which good repute in any highly organised industrial community ultimately rests is pecuniary strength; and the means of showing pecuniary strength, and so gaining or retaining a good name, are leisure and a conspicuous consumption of goods” (Veblen 2005, p. 58).
- 44.
See Hall et al. (2008, p. 168).
- 45.
As Canfora (2006, pp. 358–360) has pointed out, the ideal of democracy must not be misidentified with a type of constitution, political system or form of government. Also, “democracy” is not a synonym of “parliamentary system”. Namely, democracy is primarily a specific constellation of class relations determined by “the predominance of demos”. To put it another way, “egalitarianism is the very essence of democracy” (Bobbio, quoted in Canfora 2006, p. 259). Accordingly, economic and social inequalities are the key enemy of democracy (see Wallerstein 2004, pp. 157–165). “Democracies” as they really exist are in fact “mixed systems” combining the “electoral principle” and the reality of oligarchic power. Moreover, in the post-modern context, it is freedom that is winning a victory over democracy—that is, of course, not freedom for all, but freedom for the rich (individuals, families, regions and nations).
- 46.
For a concise analysis of that type of (“opiatized”) “social” control, see Scheerer and Hess 1997, pp. 119–120.
- 47.
For a description of the “new governance”, see Lee (2002, pp. 121–127).
- 48.
- 49.
As Gorz has pointed out, mass rebellion was focused on imposed work rhythms, wage differentials, enterprise discipline, bullying foremen, close monitoring by bosses, supervision by means of regulations, an exploitative capitalist regime (based upon the forced extraction of unpaid surplus labour), and so forth: “These were all so many ways of refusing to accept not just the oppressive organisation of the big factories, large-scale offices and big department stores, but the permanent, quasi-institutional pursuit of class compromise—a pursuit which was the very cornerstone of the ‘Fordist compromise’. The social movements of the years 1967–1974 consciously took their stand away from the terrain marked out by the institutions of the state-society. Instead of making demands, they sought to change ‘life’ for themselves—to change what conditioned it and what it was made up of. […] Contrary to the forecast of the founders of the welfare state, social protection and benefits had not reconciled populations with capitalist society, nor had the procedures for permanent negotiation and arbitration defused social antagonisms. In fact, the opposite was the case” (1999, pp. 10–11).
- 50.
As Žižek has shown, structural violence is inherent to the “normal” functioning of the capitalist system: “Systemic violence is thus something like the notorious ‘dark matter’ of physics, the counterpart to an all-too-visible subjective violence. It may be invisible, but it has to be taken into account if one is to make sense of what otherwise seem to be ‘irrational’ explosions of subjective violence. Benjaminian ‘divine violence’ is precisely the direct subjectivization of (or, rather, the direct subjective reaction to) this objective violence” (2009, p. 481).
- 51.
For a condensed description of the main sources of indignation that have (over the last two centuries) continually fuelled the criticism of capitalism, see Boltanski and Chiapello (2005, p. 37).
- 52.
For a comprehensive analysis of the chief consequences of “over-accumulation” (Marx), see Kurz (2000, pp. 81–84).
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Kanduč, Z. (2012). Crime, Class Control, Structural Violence and Social Formations “In Transition”. In: Šelih, A., Završnik, A. (eds) Crime and Transition in Central and Eastern Europe. Springer, New York, NY. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4614-3517-4_10
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