Dynamic Monopoly and Oligopoly Models
Table 10.1 in the previous chapter identifies 12 classic models of oligopoly. In Chap. 10 we analyzed the static Cournot, Bertrand, and Cournot–Bertrand models. We also investigated the case where firms could choose whether to compete in output (as in Cournot) or price (as in Bertrand). These are labeled models M1–M4 in Table 10.1.
KeywordsDominant Firm Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium Strategic Variable Trigger Strategy Cournot Model
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