Dynamic Monopoly and Oligopoly Models

  • Victor J. Tremblay
  • Carol Horton Tremblay
Chapter
Part of the Springer Texts in Business and Economics book series (STBE)

Abstract

Table 10.1 in the previous chapter identifies 12 classic models of oligopoly. In Chap. 10 we analyzed the static Cournot, Bertrand, and Cournot–Bertrand models. We also investigated the case where firms could choose whether to compete in output (as in Cournot) or price (as in Bertrand). These are labeled models M1–M4 in Table 10.1.

Keywords

Mold Assure Nash Verse Undercut 

References

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2012

Authors and Affiliations

  • Victor J. Tremblay
    • 1
  • Carol Horton Tremblay
    • 1
  1. 1.Department of EconomicsOregon State UniversityCorvallisUSA

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