Abstract
Game theory is presented with three examples. The first is the arms race showing how two counties competing in the development of weapons can cause each other to spiral up in their weapons stocks. The model allows one to play with the parameters to determine how to stop such as race. The second example is of the optimal operation of a barter economy. The third is an auction model with parameters determined by actual bidding to find the value of adding more information to a system.
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Ruth, M., Hannon, B. (2012). Modeling Economic Games. In: Modeling Dynamic Economic Systems. Modeling Dynamic Systems. Springer, Boston, MA. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4614-2209-9_15
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4614-2209-9_15
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