Abstract
This paper analyzes the framework of multi-level emergency management conducted by government, company and project managers. There exists the fact that sometimes, in the construction market, construction accidents are not reported, and information asymmetry is a main factor that causes ethical risk for emergency management. Using modern information asymmetry theory in economics, this paper studies the dynamic game process of emergency management behaviors with incomplete information when construction accident happens. As the sector entity undertaking project management has more information and is responsible for the accident, moral hazard and adverse selection may happen during emergency management of construction accident. This paper suggests that a system should be established to encourage integrity behaviors and to prevent discreditable behaviors. Effective emergency management system should be able to solve the problem that information about project construction accident is prevented from reporting.
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Liu, R. (2012). A Game Analysis on Multi-Level Emergency Management for Construction Accident. In: Hou, Z. (eds) Measuring Technology and Mechatronics Automation in Electrical Engineering. Lecture Notes in Electrical Engineering, vol 135. Springer, New York, NY. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4614-2185-6_2
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4614-2185-6_2
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