Abstract
When modeling labor supply economists tend to be committed to the leisure/goods trade-off based on a 1930 model by Lionel Robbins that does not make room for effects of marriage market conditions on labor supply. By introducing Work-In-Household (WiHo) and market prices for such WiHo (as explained in Chap. 2) I obtain a relatively easy time/goods trade-off graph that shares many common features with the Robbins model but also allows for effects of marriage market conditions on time allocation, including labor supply. In contrast with earlier models in this book in which individuals only consumed private goods, this model assumes that there is one public good and no private goods.
This chapter is adapted from Grossbard-Shechtman (2005).
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution.
Buying options
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Learn about institutional subscriptionsNotes
- 1.
- 2.
For simplicity of exposition the individual is a ‘she’. The model is also applicable to men.
- 3.
However, the individual only derives utility from her consuming the goods, so spouse’s consumption does not enter her utility function.
- 4.
The equality on the right is similar to the second equality found in Gronau (1977) except that in Gronau’s model a married woman does not get paid by her spouse for what she produces in the household. Figure 8.1 looks similar to the leisure/goods trade-off graph in Gronau (1977), except that in Gronau the transformation curve has slope \({f}'\), and here it has slope y/p + f’ (if p differs from 1).
- 5.
Likewise, Cherry (1998) does not consider the possibility that intra-marriage transfers are a function of the hours that a spouse spends in household production.
References
Cherry, Robert. 1998. Rational choice and the price of marriage. Feminist Economics 4:27–49.
Gronau, Reuben. 1977. Leisure, home production, and work—The theory of the allocation of time revisited. Journal of Political Economy 85:1099–1124.
Grossbard-Shechtman, Shoshana. 2005. A model of labour supply, household production, and marriage. In Advances in household economics, consumer behaviour and economic policy, ed. T. Van Hoa. London: Ashgate.
Grossbard-Shechtman, S. A., and B. Lemennicier. 1999. Marriage contracts and the law-and-economics of marriage: An Austrian perspective. Journal of Socio-Economics 28:665–690.
Robbins, Lionel. 1930. On the elasticity of demand for income in terms of efforts. Economica 10:123–129
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 2015 Springer Science+Business Media New York
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Grossbard, S. (2015). Labor Supply and Marriage Markets: A Simple Graphic Analysis with Household Public Goods. In: The Marriage Motive: A Price Theory of Marriage. Springer, New York, NY. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4614-1623-4_8
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4614-1623-4_8
Published:
Publisher Name: Springer, New York, NY
Print ISBN: 978-1-4614-1622-7
Online ISBN: 978-1-4614-1623-4
eBook Packages: Business and EconomicsEconomics and Finance (R0)