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Compensating Differentials in Marriage Markets and more New Implications for Labor Supply Based on a Marshallian Marriage Market Analysis

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The Marriage Motive: A Price Theory of Marriage
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Abstract

Chapter 4 analyzed labor supply, assuming that there is only one type of man and one type of woman. The analysis here is at the micro level, in line with Chap. 3: it is assumed that there are many types of substitutable individuals participating in multiple markets for work-in-household (WiHo; defined in Chap. 2 and 3). A price mechanism based on market values of WiHo facilitates selection of spouses into marriages, assists individual household members in coordinating their time use decisions, and influences distribution of resources within the household. It is shown how individual characteristics such as age, race, and education may be associated with variation in WiHo prices and therefore labor supply. Characteristics of the self and the spouse are examined separately and implications for estimation methods are discussed. The model also calls for examination of the effect of laws and regulations affecting marriage market conditions. In the next chapter it is shown how this hedonic market model offers new insights on income and wage effects on labor supply. The sex ratio effects presented in Chap. 4 are also revisited.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Differences in the age at marriage of men and women are an interesting phenomenon that economists have also tried to explain. For instance, Bergstrom and Bagnoli (1993) and Danziger and Neuman (1999).

  2. 2.

    Hersch (2013) defines the four tiers as follows: Tier 1 are highly-selective, private research-intensive universities; Tier 2 are selective private liberal arts colleges; Tier 3 are selective, public research-intensive universities; and Tier 4 are public and private colleges and universities that are not research intensive, grant few or no doctoral degrees, and are not highly selective.

  3. 3.

    These calculations are based on calculations using the Current Population Surveys, US Census, Table Creator, at http://www.census.gov/cps/data/cpstablecreator.html.

  4. 4.

    This part is adapted from Grossbard-Shechtman (1996).

  5. 5.

    This assumption is also found in Becker’s (1973) section on the division of marital output.

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Correspondence to Shoshana Grossbard .

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Grossbard, S. (2015). Compensating Differentials in Marriage Markets and more New Implications for Labor Supply Based on a Marshallian Marriage Market Analysis. In: The Marriage Motive: A Price Theory of Marriage. Springer, New York, NY. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4614-1623-4_5

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