Abstract
This chapter discusses strategies to coordinate charging of autonomous plug-in electric vehicles (PEVs). The chapter briefly reviews the state of the art with respect to grid level analyses of PEV charging, and frames PEV coordination in terms of whether they are centralized or decentralized and whether they are optimal or near-optimal in some sense. The bulk of the chapter is devoted to presenting centralized and decentralized cost-optimizing frameworks for identifying and coordinating PEV charging. We use a centralized framework to show that “valley filling” charge patterns are globally optimal. Decentralized electricity cost minimizing frameworks for PEV charging can be framed in the context of non-cooperative dynamic game theory and are related to recent work on mean field and potential games. Interestingly, in this context it can be difficult to achieve a Nash equilibrium (NE) if electricity price is the sole objective. The decentralized algorithm discussed in this chapter introduces a very small penalty term that damps unwanted negotiating dynamics. With this term, the decentralized algorithm takes on the form of a contraction mapping and, in the infinite system limit, the NE is unique and the algorithm will converge to it under relatively loose assumptions.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
References
Lemoine D, Kammen D, Farrell A (2008) An innovation and policy agenda for commercially competitive plug-in hybrid electric vehicles. Environ Res Lett 3, 014003
Goebel C (2011) The business value of ICT-controlled plug-in electrical vehicle charging. In: Submitted to 32nd International Conference on Information Systems, Shanghai, China, pp 803–810
Saber A, Venayagamoorthy G (2010) Efficient utilization of renewable energy sources by gridable vehicles in cyber-physical energy systems. IEEE Syst J 4(3):285–294
Waraich R, Galus M, Dobler C, Balmer M, Andersson G, Axhausen K (2009) Plug-in hybrid electric vehicles and smart grid: Investigations based on a micro-simulation. Technical report, Institute for Transport Planning and Systems, ETH Zurich
Callaway D, Hiskens I (2011) Achieving controllability of electric loads. Proc IEEE 99(1):184–199
Rotering N, Ilic M (2010) Optimal charge control of plug-in hybrid electric vehicles in deregulated electricity markets. EEE Trans Power Syst 26(3):1021–1029
Galus M, Andersson G (2008) Demand management of grid connected plug-in hybrid electric vehicles (PHEV). In: Proceedings of the IEEE Energy 2030 Conference, Altanta, GA, pp 1–8
Denholm P, Short W (2006) An evaluation of utility system impacts and benefits of optimally dispatched plug-in hybrid electric vehicles. Technical Report NREL/TP-620-40293, National Renewable Energy Laboratory
Rahman S, Shrestha G (1993) An investigation into the impact of electric vehicle load on the electric utility distribution system. IEEE Trans Power Deliv 8(2):591–597
Koyanagi F, Uriu Y (1997) Modeling power consumption by electric vehicles and its impact on power demand. Electr Eng Jpn 120(4):40–47
Koyanagi F, Inuzuka T, Uriu Y, Yokoyama R (1999) Monte Carlo simulation on the demand impact by quick chargers for electric vehicles. In: Proceedings of the IEEE Power Engineering Society Summer Meeting, Istanbul, Turkey, vol 2, pp 1031–1036
Ma Z, Callaway D, Hiskens I (2010) Decentralized charging control for large populations of plug-in electric vehicles. In: Proceedings of the 49th IEEE Conference on Decision and Control, Atlanta, GA, pp 206–212
Ma Z, Hiskens I, Callaway D (2011b) Distributed MPC methods in charging control of large populations of plug-in electric vehicles. In: Proceedings of the IFAC World Congress, Milano, Italy, pp 10493–10498
Ma Z, Callaway D, Hiskens I (2011a) Decentralized charging control of large populations of plug-in electric vehicles. in revision, IEEE Transactions on Control Systems Technology, to appear
Monderer D, Shapley L (1996) Potential games. Game and Econ Behav 14:124–143
Altman E, Başar T, Jiménez T, Shimkin N (2001) Routing into two parallel links: Game-theoretic distributed algorithms. J Parallel Distr Comput 61(9):1367–1381
Altman E, Boulogne T, El-Azouzi R, Jimenez T, Wynter L (2006) A survey on networking games in telecommunications. Comput Oper Res 33:286–311
Christodoulou G, Mirrokni V, Sidiropoulos A (2006) Convergence and approximation in potential games. In: Proceedings of the 23rd Symposium on Theoretical Aspects of Computer Science (STACS), Dresden, Germany, pp 349–360
Even-Dar E, Kesselman A, Mansour Y (2001) Convergence time to Nash equilibirum in load balancing. ACM Trans Comput Logic 2(3):111–132
Berenbrink P, Friedetzky T, Goldberg L, Goldberg P, Hu Z, Martin R (2006) Distributed selfish load balancing. In: Proceedings of the 17th Annual ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms, Miami, Florida, pp 354–363
Blum A, Even-Dar E, Ligett K (2006) Routing without regret: On convergence to Nash equilibria of regret-minimizing algorithms in routing games. In: Proceedings of the 25th ACM Symposium on Principles of Distributed Computing, Denver, CO, pp 45–52
Fischer S, Olbrich L, Vocking B (2008) Approximating Wardrop equilibria with finitely many agents. Distr Comput 21(2):129–139
Fischer S, Racke H, Vocking B (2006) Fast convergence to Wardrop equilibria by adaptive sampling methods. In: Proceedings of the 38th Annual ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing, Seattle, WA, pp 653–662
Borenstein S, Bushnell J, Wolak F (2002) Measuring market inefficiencies in California’s restructured wholesale electricity market. Am Econ Rev 92(5):1376–1405
Bushnell J, Mansur E, Saravia C (2008) Vertical arrangements, market structure, and competition: An analysis of restructured US electricity markets. Am Econ Rev 98(1):237–266
Hobbs B (2002) Linear complementarity models of Nash-Cournot competition in bilateral and POOLCO power markets. IEEE Trans Power Syst 16(2):194–202
Cunningham L, Baldick R, Baughman M (2002) An empirical study of applied game theory: Transmission constrained Cournot behavior. IEEE Trans Power Syst 17(1):166–172
Pettersen E (2004) Managing end-user flexibility in electricity markets. Fakultet for samfunnsvitenskap og teknologiledelse, Institutt for industriell økonomi og teknologiledelse, NTNU
Philpott A, Pettersen E (2006) Optimizing demand-side bids in day-ahead electricity markets. IEEE Trans Power Syst 21(2):488–498
Huang M, Caines P, Malhamé R (2003) Individual and mass behaviour in large population stochastic wireless power control problems: Centralized and Nash equilibrium solutions. In: Proceedings of the 42th IEEE International Conference on Decision and Control, Maui, Hawaii, pp 98–103
Huang M, Caines P, Malhamé R (2007) Large-population cost-coupled LQG problems with non-uniform agents: Individual-mass behaviour and decentralized epsilon-Nash equilibria. IEEE Trans Automat Contr 52(9):1560–1571
Wardrop J (1952) Some theoretical aspects of road traffic research. In: Proceedings of the Institution of Civil Engineers, Part 2, pp 1: 325–78
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Editor information
Editors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 2012 Springer Science+Business Media, LLC
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Ma, Z., Callaway, D., Hiskens, I. (2012). Optimal Charging Control for Plug-In Electric Vehicles. In: Chakrabortty, A., Ilić, M. (eds) Control and Optimization Methods for Electric Smart Grids. Power Electronics and Power Systems, vol 3. Springer, New York, NY. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4614-1605-0_13
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4614-1605-0_13
Published:
Publisher Name: Springer, New York, NY
Print ISBN: 978-1-4614-1604-3
Online ISBN: 978-1-4614-1605-0
eBook Packages: EngineeringEngineering (R0)