Skip to main content

The Failure of Public Finance

  • Chapter
  • First Online:
The Ethics of Tax Evasion

Abstract

A number of explanations are commonly presented in public finance texts as reasons why government intervention in the economy will improve performance. This chapter questions the validity of each of them. The chapter examines the merit goods argument, equity considerations, growth and development, and stabilization, and finds the arguments offered in their behalf to be unpersuasive. Public finance as presented in textbooks is seen as relying on rather dubious normative arguments.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this chapter

Chapter
USD 29.95
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
eBook
USD 299.00
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as EPUB and PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
Softcover Book
USD 379.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Compact, lightweight edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info
Hardcover Book
USD 379.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Durable hardcover edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Purchases are for personal use only

Institutional subscriptions

Notes

  1. 1.

    A.B. Atkinson and J.E. Stiglitz, Lectures on Public Economics, New York, McGraw- Hill, 1980; A. L. Auld and F.C. Miller, Principles of Public Finance: A Canadian Text (Toronto: Methuen, 1982); J.F. Due, Government Finance: An Economic Analysis, Homewood (Illinois), Irwin, 1963, third edition: Richard A. Musgrave, Peggy B. Musgrave, and Richard M. Bird, Public Finance in Theory and Practice, first Canadian edition (Toronto: McGraw-Hill Ryerson, 1987); Douglas J. McCready, The Canadian Public Sector (Toronto: Butterworths, 1985); C. S. Shoup, Public Finance, Chicago, Aldine, 1969; Charles Wolf, Jr., Markets or Governments: Choosing Between Imperfect Alternatives (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1988).

  2. 2.

    For a group of people who purport to dislike advertising, the public finance economists do very well in this regard.

  3. 3.

    The near universal inclusion of education among merit goods by college professors might, however, give one pause about possible financial interest.

  4. 4.

    It is marred, however, by the simplistic identification of equity with equality: “Even when the central importance of distributional equity is acknowledged, the question remains, What standard should be used to evaluate it? The answer will be very different, and often ambiguous, depending on whether equity is interpreted in the sense of equality of outcome or equality of opportunity (p. 19). That’s it? That is how far equity can stretch? Between one or another type of equality? Nonsense. Equity means justice, or fairness, and need have nothing whatever to do with equality. An equitable division of the points between two football teams is whatever points they have earned, not a tie score; an equitable division of the haul in a fishing expedition is whatever had been agreed upon beforehand, not necessarily equal shares.

  5. 5.

    Later on in his analysis, Wolf sees this relationship as “complex...difficult and ambiguous” (pp. 87–91).

  6. 6.

    Wolf continues: “Another perspective for viewing distributional equity is quite unrelated to market failure in the strict sense. From this perspective, the equilibrium redistribution previously referred to may be quite inequitable in terms of one or another ethical norm. Even if the market could surmount the narrow type of ‘finance’ discussed above, its distributional outcome might still be socially and ethically unacceptable from the standpoint of one or more such norms. On these groups, the distributional outcomes of even perfectly functioning markets can be justifiably criticized.” Much as it pains the present authors to appear to defend “perfectly functioning markets” (We maintain there is no such thing, and that the perfectly competitive model is a vast red herring), this last statement of Wolf’s does not logically follow the foregoing. The distribution arising from market interaction can only be justifiably criticized if the ethical norms to which Wolf refers are themselves valid. But no such proof has been even considered, much less offered. In any case, to do so would be to take us very far afield indeed from the realm of (positive) economics.

  7. 7.

    Until they are one day proven to exist, we can now only accept them on the basis of faith.

  8. 8.

    These authors, unfortunately, ascribe fully to the version of the externalities theory we have been attributing to Wolf. (See p. 91).

  9. 9.

    The ability to pay principle is deeply flawed. For discussions of this point, see McGee (1998a, b, c).

  10. 10.

    Those who maintain that paying taxes, or voting, or living in the country, or swearing allegiance, or singing the national anthem, or maintaining citizenship is sufficient to establish willingness to pay taxes are invited to peruse Spooner (1870) 1966.

  11. 11.

    We abstract from such irrelevancies as quality, associated services (e.g., delivery), location of the vendor, etc.

  12. 12.

    To be fair to MM&B, they do note that “with technical progress raising future productivity, the capital stock needed to sustain the consumption standard may fall, calling for a higher discount rate” (p. 169). But this admission is marred in two ways. First, they base their conclusion on the discredited notion of (intergenerational) equity. Second, they still call for government intervention into the economy. This is problematic because they do so if the present generation is “too greedy,” and they also do so if the present generation is not greedy enough (due to the fact that future generations will be richer than they because of improved technology). In other words, the verdict is in: market failure, the need for government intervention; the only open question is whether there is too much or too little greed. Talk about angels dancing on the tip of a pin.

  13. 13.

    There are serious arguments to the effect that it does not. See Rothbard (1970, 1973, 1982), Friedman (1989), Spooner (1870) 1966.

References

  • Kenneth Arrow, Social Choice and Individual Values, 2nd ed., New York: Wiley, 1963.

    Google Scholar 

  • Rothbard M.N, The Mystery of Banking, New York, Richardson and Snyder, 1983.

    Google Scholar 

  • Murray N. Rothbard, America’s Great Depression, Princeton, NJ, D. Van Nostrand Co., [1963] 1975. Also published by Nash Publishing Co., Los Angeles, 1972 with an introduction to the 2nd edition. Revised edition, New York University Press, 1975.

    Google Scholar 

  • Ronald Coase, The Problem of Social Cost Journal of Law and Economics, October 1960.

    Google Scholar 

  • David Friedman, The Machinery of Freedom: Guide to a Radical Capitalism, 2nd ed., La Salle, IL: Open Court, 1989.

    Google Scholar 

  • Milton Friedman, and Anna J. Schwartz, A Monetary History of the United States, ­1867–1960 New York: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1963.

    Google Scholar 

  • F. A. Hayek, ed., Collectivist Economic Planning, Clifton, N. J.: Kelley, 1975 (1933).

    Google Scholar 

  • Mark Hughes, The Ties That Bind, Vancouver: The Fraser Institute, 1992.

    Google Scholar 

  • Douglass J. McCready, The Canadian Public Sector, Toronto, Butterworths, 1984.

    Google Scholar 

  • Robert W. McGee, Is the Ability to Pay Principle Ethically Bankrupt? 1 Journal of Accounting, Ethics & Public Policy (Summer 1998a).

    Google Scholar 

  • Robert W. McGee, Are Discriminatory Tax Rates Ethically Justifiable? 1 Journal of Accounting, Ethics & Public Policy (Fall 1998b).

    Google Scholar 

  • Robert W. McGee, Should Rich People Pay More than Poor People? An Ethical Look at the Graduated Income Tax , Commentaries on the Law of Accounting & Finance (1998c).

    Google Scholar 

  • Ludwig von Mises, The Theory of Money and Credit, Irvington-on-Hudson, NY, Foundation for Economic Education, [1912] 1971.

    Google Scholar 

  • Richard A. Musgrave, The Theory of Public Finance, New York: McGraw-Hill, 1959.

    Google Scholar 

  • Charles Murray, Losing Ground: American Social Policy from 1950 to 1980 New York: Basic Books, 1984.

    Google Scholar 

  • Charles Murray, In Pursuit: Of Happiness and Good Government, New York, Simon & Schuster, 1988.

    Google Scholar 

  • Murray N. Rothbard, Power and Market: Government and the Economy Menlo Park Cal.: Institute for Humane Studies, 1970.

    Google Scholar 

  • Murray N. Rothbard, For a New Liberty, Macmillan, New York, 1973.

    Google Scholar 

  • Murray N. Rothbard, The Ethics of Liberty, Humanities Press, Atlantic Highlands, N.J., 1982.

    Google Scholar 

  • Murray N. Rothbard, Man, Economy and State, Los Angeles, Nash, 1970.

    Google Scholar 

  • Lysander Spooner, No Treason, Larkspur, Colorado, (1870) 1966.

    Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

Authors

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Walter Block .

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

Copyright information

© 2012 Springer Science+Business Media, LLC

About this chapter

Cite this chapter

Block, W., Kordsmeier, W., Horton, J. (2012). The Failure of Public Finance. In: McGee, R. (eds) The Ethics of Tax Evasion. Springer, New York, NY. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4614-1287-8_14

Download citation

Publish with us

Policies and ethics