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Symbiotes and defensive Mutualism: Moving Target Defense

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Moving Target Defense

Part of the book series: Advances in Information Security ((ADIS,volume 54))

Abstract

If we wish to break the continual cycle of patching and replacing our core monoculture systems to defend against attacker evasion tactics, we must redesign the way systems are deployed so that the attacker can no longer glean the information about one system that allows attacking any other like system. Hence, a new poly-culture architecture that provides complete uniqueness for each distinct device would thwart many remote attacks (except perhaps for insider attacks). We believe a new security paradigm based on perpetual mutation and diversity, driven by symbiotic defensive mutualism can fundamentally change the ‘cat and mouse’ dynamic which has impeded the development of truly effective security mechanism to date. We propose this new ‘clean slate design’ principle and conjecture that this defensive strategy can also be applied to legacy systems widely deployed today. Fundamentally, the technique diversifies the defensive system of the protected host system thwarting attacks against defenses commonly executed by modern malware.

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Correspondence to Ang Cui .

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Cui, A., Stolfo, S.J. (2011). Symbiotes and defensive Mutualism: Moving Target Defense. In: Jajodia, S., Ghosh, A., Swarup, V., Wang, C., Wang, X. (eds) Moving Target Defense. Advances in Information Security, vol 54. Springer, New York, NY. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4614-0977-9_5

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4614-0977-9_5

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  • Publisher Name: Springer, New York, NY

  • Print ISBN: 978-1-4614-0976-2

  • Online ISBN: 978-1-4614-0977-9

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