Skip to main content

Part of the book series: Topics in Regulatory Economics and Policy Series ((TREP,volume 2))

  • 32 Accesses

Abstract

Microeconomic theory traditionally assumed that firms attempt to maximize profits, that is, firms are single-minded in the pursuit of profits. Accordingly, the theory implicitly assumed that either every individual in the firm was so inclined or that they could be made to act as if they were. These assumptions are due, in part, to a view of the firm whereby the owners occupy the top of the “pyramid.” These owners then elect a board of directors who reflect and carry out the wishes of the owners to maximize profits. The board, in turn, hires managers who carry out the interests of the owners indirectly through the orders of the board: the board fires those managers who do not. Managers give orders to subordinates, who give orders to their subordinates in a manner which assures that the wishes of the owners are carried out.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this chapter

Chapter
USD 29.95
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
eBook
USD 129.00
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
Softcover Book
USD 169.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Compact, lightweight edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info
Hardcover Book
USD 169.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Durable hardcover edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Purchases are for personal use only

Institutional subscriptions

Preview

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

Authors

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

Copyright information

© 1988 Kluwer Academic Publishers, Boston

About this chapter

Cite this chapter

Frantz, R.S. (1988). Empirical Evidence: Ownership Form. In: X-Efficiency: Theory, Evidence and Applications. Topics in Regulatory Economics and Policy Series, vol 2. Springer, Boston, MA. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4613-3799-7_7

Download citation

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4613-3799-7_7

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Boston, MA

  • Print ISBN: 978-1-4613-3801-7

  • Online ISBN: 978-1-4613-3799-7

  • eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive

Publish with us

Policies and ethics