The Rhetoric of Toys
Are there bounds and borders to the world of play? If so, how are these borders defined? And what, if anything, might be learned through play? These questions suggest that play exhibits an autonomy that is in some measure describable or distinct. But what is at issue in a description of play? Is it enough to simply point to this and that experience, claiming that the one is play and the other is not? Or, must one ask: How does play come into being? How is it possible that we recognize an act of play?
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- 1) Piaget continues: “Proof that this interpretation is the right one, however painful it may be to our realism, is that the child makes no attempt to search for an object when it is neither within an extension of the gesture made, nor in its initial position; here obs. 28–33 are decisive.”Google Scholar
- (2).The toy has become increasingly complicated in design. Rules and regulations accompany each item. Today the child is not only provided with a toy, but is also given instructions for its use. Certain computerized toys actually “reward” the child by playing a delightful tune when the proper manipulations have been completed. The computer robot is programmed play, technical play, dead serious play. Far from centering around the ridiculous gesture, technical play actually condemns the absurd or nonconforming act.Google Scholar