Ethics, Foundations, and Science: Response to Alasdair MacIntyre

Abstract

To a philosopher the only sight less cheering than MacIntyre’s portrait of philosophers attacking the views of other philosophers is that of a philosopher attacking philosophy. I propose to defend moral philosophy against MacIntyre’s critique. I shall focus on the work of John Rawls, both because I believe that MacIntyre’s criticisms are incorrect, and because I believe that a proper understanding of Rawls’s theory can throw some light on issues concerning the foundations of ethics as well as their relationship to science. It is strange that so little philosophical attention has been paid to specifying what might be meant by reference to the foundations of ethics, and I shall make some initial attempts to clarify that question.

… The foundations of ethics… those universal principles, from which all censure or approbation is ultimately derived.

Hume

Foundations of morality are like all other foundations; if you dig too much about them the superstructure will come tumbling down.

Butler