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The Problem of Theoretical Pluralism in Psychology

  • Joseph R. Royce

Abstract

The contemporary morass of facts and theories has resulted in a state of intellectual paralysis in the discipline of psychology. In short, we need a pragmatic basis for dealing with theoretical pluralism. Because extant theories are refuted by better theories rather than by direct refutation I end up with the paradoxical conclusion that the best way to deal with theoretical pluralism is to produce more theory—but with the qualification that the new theory be more theoretically powerful than its predecessors and/or its competitors. The paper concludes with an elaboration of the role of dialectic analysis in the evaluation of complementary and competitive theories.

Keywords

Immature Science Mature Science Affective Domain Theory Appraisal Extant Theory 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Plenum Press, New York 1985

Authors and Affiliations

  • Joseph R. Royce
    • 1
  1. 1.Center for Advanced Study in Theoretical PsychologyUniversity of AlbertaEdmontonCanada

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