Risk Compensation, Behavior Choice, and the Enforcement of Drunk Driving Statutes

Abstract

Combining well-known research results from the alcohol and driving literature with the concept of risk compensation, this paper provides some insight on the relationship between public information and the effective deterrence of drunk driving. Results suggest that our public information programs, although changing in the right direction, may be seriously counterproductive.

Results from a variety of statistical studies show death and injury rates to be the same or even less at moderate levels of blood alcohol content than they are at zero levels. These results have usually been regarded as an anomaly to be explained away. But, the statistics are consistent with risk compensation theory—which implies a driver’s ability to compensate behaviorally for moderate alcohol impairment. Most drivers intuitively understand this and drive within safe (and legal) limits. But, the weight of media messages is still that all drinking-driving is dangerous and probably illegal—with strong moral overtones. The result is cognitive dissonance. The resolution of this dissonance is likely to result in lenient and inconsistent treatment of drunk drivers by the community. Our media messages have little affect on alcohol abusers. They seem to affect other citizens in a counter-productive way—convincing them that their typically responsible behavior places ahem in legal jeopardy. Consistency with well-established research results and new survey data is demonstrated, and media alternatives are discussed.