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The Framing of Decisions and the Psychology of Choice

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Behavioral Decision Making

Abstract

Explanations and predictions of people’s choices, in everyday life as well as in the social sciences, are often founded on the assumption of human rationality. The definition of rationality has been much debated, but there is general agreement that rational choices should satisfy some elementary requirements of consistency and coherence. In this chapter, we describe decision problems in which people systematically violate the requirements of consistency and coherence, and we trace these violations to the psychological principles that govern the perception of decision problems and the evaluation of options.

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Psychology, Stanford University, Stanford, California, 94305, USA

    Amos Tversky

  2. Department of Psychology, University of British Columbia, Vancouver, British Columbia, V6T 1W5, Canada

    Daniel Kahneman

Authors
  1. Amos Tversky
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  2. Daniel Kahneman
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Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. City of London Polytechnic, London, England

    George Wright

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© 1985 Plenum Press, New York

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Tversky, A., Kahneman, D. (1985). The Framing of Decisions and the Psychology of Choice. In: Wright, G. (eds) Behavioral Decision Making. Springer, Boston, MA. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4613-2391-4_2

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4613-2391-4_2

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Boston, MA

  • Print ISBN: 978-1-4612-9460-3

  • Online ISBN: 978-1-4613-2391-4

  • eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive

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