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The Credible Modelling of Economic Agents with Limited Rationality

  • Bruce Edmonds
  • Scott Moss

Abstract

A model of bounded rationality suitable for modelling economic agents is proposed. Agents’ beliefs are modeled as descriptions of tentative models. These models are inductively found by a limited incremental search based on the current model and by combinations of past models from a space restricted by the imposition of a priori beliefs. The action of the agent is then decided by a search of the goal space where it intersects the model space (if any).

Keywords

Model Description Economic Agent Limited Rationality Reaction Function Policy Modelling 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Kluwer Academic Publishers 1996

Authors and Affiliations

  • Bruce Edmonds
  • Scott Moss
    • 1
  1. 1.Centre for Policy ModellingManchester Metropolitan UniversityManchesterUK

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