Analyzing Games by Sequences of Metatheories

  • A. Vilks
Part of the Theory and Decision Library book series (TDLC, volume 20)

Abstract

Bonanno (1991) suggests a very straightforward way of representing extensive games by propositions (or well-formed formulas in the sense of propositional logic). As an example, consider the game tree of Figure 12.1.

Keywords

Nash 

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Copyright information

© Kluwer Academic Publishers 1997

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  • A. Vilks

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