Abstract
Because of the wealth of his contributions to American law and to the shaping of the United States Constitution, and because of his principal role in interpreting Peirce’s pragmatism and semiotic theory and method into what has developed as the most revolutionary movement in modern law, namely, legal realism and its congeners, the thought of Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes should be examined more closely than is possible within the scope of this book. The writings about Holmes, from the viewpoints of jurisprudence, social philosophy, and legal philosophy, are voluminous, raising questions far beyond those addressed in this introduction to legal semiotics; they warrant a separate study on Holmes, which is in preparation.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Preview
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
Notes
See Moore (1979:238–268, especially 239, 240).
See also Parker (1979:269–295).
Ibid., 260.
Ibid., 272, 273.
Ibid.
Peirce (1967:302, 303, L75).
See McCloskey (1962:34–46); also Wright (1938).
See Hayek (1973:115).
Ibid., 121.
Ibid., 141 ff.
See Friedman (1962:219–243).
Ibid., 219.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 1988 Plenum Press, New York
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Kevelson, R. (1988). The Constitution as Interpretant Sign. In: The Law as a System of Signs. Topics in Contemporary Semiotics. Springer, Boston, MA. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4613-0911-6_18
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4613-0911-6_18
Publisher Name: Springer, Boston, MA
Print ISBN: 978-1-4612-8241-9
Online ISBN: 978-1-4613-0911-6
eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive