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Mediation and Conflicts of Moralities

  • William C. Charron

Abstract

I am interested in the historical fact of disagreement among advocates of different systems of morality offered as fair and impartial schemes for adjudicating economic, status, and religious conflicts. The question is more than academic when moralists take the political turn, struggling to get the coercive power of the state behind the social order each considers fair. I am assuming that not all fairness and justice claims are guises for advancing self- or group-interest, although, certainly, many are. I am assuming that disputants over the morality of, say, abortion, nuclear deterrence strategies, or laissez-faire economic policy -- to mention only salient issues - can be sincere in their moral claim-making.

Keywords

Bargaining Problem Positional Good Arbitration Scheme Foundationalist Argument Negotiation Text 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Plenum Press, New York 1988

Authors and Affiliations

  • William C. Charron
    • 1
  1. 1.St. Louis UniversitySpain

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