Legal Realism in a Cross-Cultural Context

  • Michael Saltman


Legal realism is, perhaps, a rather confusing misnomer that aggregates under its heading a number of schools of thought, which, on face value, appear to have very little in common. At the risk of oversimplification, the basic proposition of the American Legal Realist Movement has been that the Law is “what the courts do”. It does not call for too much imagination to understand why this proposition merits the epithet of realism. On the other hand, what is known as Scandinavian Legal Realism is characteristically more eclectic than its American counterpart by claiming, as one of its postulates, that laws are valid by virtue of the fact that people believe them to be so.


Legal Discourse Legal Thinking Legal Realism Colonial Authority Judicial Body 
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Copyright information

© Plenum Press, New York 1988

Authors and Affiliations

  • Michael Saltman
    • 1
  1. 1.University of HaifaIsrael

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