The New Realism and Lawlessness in Kaleidoscope
When Harold Laski writes on the topic of Mr. Justice Holmes he draws upon nearly a lifetime of correspondence between them, a correspondence in which they critically shared and compared some of the leading and the emergent ideas of their time, including the theory of signs and the pragmatic philosophy of Charles Sanders Peirce. It is from the writings of the patriarchs of pragmatism -- Peirce, James, Dewey -- that Holmes drew his major insights for the movement in Legal Realism of which he is the acclaimed founder, I claim. The Legal Realism which directly followed Holmes, mainly through the work of Garland, Frank, Llewellyn and others of that period, was not a unified movement; rather, it shared certain tenets which, in spite of the diversity of views among its spokesmen, can be thought of as a cohesive “school” or movement in American law.
KeywordsManifold Refraction Defend Metaphor Lester
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