Abstract
It is a fact, generally accepted but still not sufficiently appreciated, that during the first half of our century the physicists, in connection with problems in their discipline, developed a philosophy of their own — some physicists only, of course, and not all in the same way. Nevertheless, the event is remarkable and deserves to be made the subject matter of a larger monograph. The modern physicist with Galileo as his prototype is inclined by nature to avoid philosophical questions, or at any rate to keep physics free of them. Therefore, whenever he violates this rule, there certainly must be good reasons for doing so. As is well known, for the movement under discussion the reasons were mainly the establishment of the special and general theory of relativity and, even more so, quantum theory. In the articles of Ch. II it is not so much these theories themselves but rather some consequences of their establishment that are selected for closer inspection: the clarification and securing of an appropriate concept of progress ([6] and [9]), Schrödinger’s reaction to the new physics ([7]), the endeavors of Einstein to obtain a physically justifiable understanding of reality ([8]) and incorporation of quantum theory into Planck’s idea of scientific realism ([10]).
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References
See also Scheibe 1997b, Ch. I.2 and 3, and 1999 passim
First published as Scheibe 1988b
Misner et al. 1973, Section 17.4.
Rohrlich 1965, Ch. 1
Kuhn 21970; Kuhn 1977
Cohen 1985
Boltzmann 1905, pp. 94ff
Nernst 1893, pp. 2f
Nernst 1911, pp. 4f
Nernst 1922, pp. 489 and.491f
Einstein 1914, pp. 740f
Planck 1913, p. 164
Kienle 1933, pp. 115f; Lakatos 1970; for Kuhn see no. 3
Bondi 1983, pp. 89f. It has to be noticed that Bondi is influenced by Popper’s philosophy of science. I nonetheless quote him as a spokesman of physics because I feel ceratin that he is physicist enough to have rejected Popper’s view had he found obvious reasons for that from physics
One exception is Feyerabend, but only in a very incidental manner. See his 1965b, p. 271, and his 1970a, p. 300
Heisenberg 1975, p. 161
Heisenberg 1958, pp. 96f (1959a, p.84)
Heisenberg 1969, p. 135
Op.cit. in no. 15, pp. 97f (p. 85)
Heisenberg 1942, pp. 18f (my italics)
Bohr 1934, p. 70
ibid. p. 87
ibid. p. 85
Bohr 1963, p. 9
Op. cit. in no. 15, p. 110
On matters controversial between Bohr and Heisenberg at times see Folse 1985, Ch. 3, sect. 7
Op. cit. in no. 15, Ch. III.
Bohr 1958, p. 39
Heisenberg 1948, p. 335
Weizsäcker 1971, p. 208f (1980, p. 169f)
Sambursky 1956, p. 97
Kemeny/ Oppenheim 1958
Popper 1972. On p. 202 Popper suggests calling ‘the demand that a new theory should contain the old one approximately... (following Bohr) the “principle of correspondence”’.
Shimony 1983, p. 215
1954, p. 15
1952, p. 481
op. cit. in no.3, p. 34
1929a, p. 317
Bertotti 1985, p. 85
1961a
ibid. p. 115ff; also op. cit. in no.7, p. 94
op. cit. in no. 8, pp. 153ff
ibid. p. 175
op. cit. in no. 3, and 1948
Locus classicus is Hertz 1894. In addition to Schrödinger’s papers referred to in no. 12 see also 1928
1948, p. 425
ibid. p. 443
1935a, p. 486
1958. This idea, formed already early by Schrödinger, belongs to a consistent wave mechanical interpretation of the microphysical world.
Smoluchovski 1918; Born 1955; Born/Hooton 1955
Exner 1919, part IV, esp. pp. 691ff; 1929b; I find Forman’s description of the development, in which he includes also Weyl, Reichenbach and others, as being a turn towards acausality misleading. See Forman 1971, esp. III.3.
1927b, p. 279. See also 1929c; 1929a; 1930, esp. p. 24; 1932
1961b, p. 27
1926, pp. 117f (Italics mine)
op. cit. in no. 17, p. 509
For a recent vindication see Dorling 1987. See also Wessels 1975.
It is not always clear which view Schrödinger is attacking. He seldom uses names or gives references. On the other hand, the views of the members of the Copenhagen school diverge. See op. cit. in no. 2 and E. Scheibe 1989b
op. cit. in no.21, p. 51
op. cit. 1930 in no.20, p. 26. This lecture, given in Munich 1930, was not published until after Schrödinger’s death.
Einstein et al. 1935. Schrödinger’s reaction was the paper referred to in no. 16.
1935b and c; 1955
op. cit. in no. 16, p. 489
op. cit. in no.21, p. 51f
See op. cit. in no. 17, pp. 507ff
Schilpp 1949 (German Edition 1955
Prank 1949 (1955)
Holton 1981, pp. 203–255
Einstein 1949a, p. 21 (1955a, p. 8)
Holton 1981, p. 230f
Planck 1949, pp. 28–51
Holton 1981, p. 225
Einstein 1949a, p. 13 (1955a, p. 4); italics mine
Einstein 1919
Einstein 1907, p. 439; italics mine)
Schilpp 1949b, p. 679 (1955b, p. 504)
ibid. p. 674 (p. 500)
Einstein 31984, p. 65 (1954, p. 292)
Einstein 1916a, p. 102
Einstein 1989, p. 115 (1954, p. 272)
Quoted from Holton 1980, p. 57
Heisenberg 1969, pp. 90–100
Poincaré 1914, p. 51f
Einstein 1923; italics mine
Einstein/ Born 1969, pp. 25 f.
Einstein 1924
Einstein 1917; 231988; Sect.l; see also Einstein 1922; 31990; p. 11f.
Einstein 1989, p. 122f (1954, p. 236)
Cf. Howard 1990
Duhem 1962, p. 187f
Einstein 31984, p. 67 (1954, p. 293)
Einstein 1989, p. 123 (1954, p. 236f)
Weizsäcker 1971, pp. 195ff (1980, pp. 157ff)
Einstein l949a, pp. 58ff (1955, p. 22f)
Einstein 1989, pp. 110–113 (1954, pp. 220–3)
Einstein 1950, p. 15
Einstein 1989, p. 115 (1954, p. 272f)
Einstein 31984, pp. 67 ff (1954, pp. 293ff)
Einstein 1989, p. 116 (1954, p. 273f)
ibid. p. 109 ( p. 226f)
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Einstein 31984, p. 69 (1954, p. 294f)
Hentschel 1986, p. 483f
Holton 1981, p. 233
Einstein 1989, p. 159 (1954, p. 266)
Einstein 1955c, p. 14; italics mine
The following quotations are from pp. 674, 669 and 680 of Einstein 1949b (pp. 500, 496 and 505 in 1955b resp.)
Einstein paraphrases an expression of Kant in the “Critique of Pure Reason”, B 526f. According to this, given something conditioned, in the realm of phenomena a regressus in the series of all conditions is only proposed (aufgegeben); however, in the realm of noumena it is already given (gegeben).
Einstein 1949b, p. 674 (1955, p. 500)
ibid. p. 669 (p. 496)
Cf. Scheibe 1986b
Einstein 1989, p. 116 f. (1954, p. 274)
Einstein 1949b, p. 684 (1955, p. 508)
Einstein 1950, p. 13
Einstein 1989, p. 17 (1954, p. 39)
Hoffmann/ Dukas 1972, p. VII
Heisenberg 1934, 1936, 1948, 1959, 1969 (Chap. 8), 1970, 1973
Heisenberg 1969, p. 131
Heisenberg 1989
Heisenberg 1969, p. 135
Heisenberg 1959, p. 84
Heisenberg 1936, p. 91; 1948, p. 333 f.; 1970 in 1971, p. 308; 1973, p. 141
Heisenberg 1973, p. 140
v. Weizsäcker 1971, p. 193 f., 213 ff., 232 ff. (1980, p. 156, pp. 173 ff., pp. 188 ff.)
Heisenberg 1959, p. 86 ff.
On the issue of how this fits in with the concept of progress developed by physi? cists themselves, see Scheibe 1988b
Heisenberg 1934, p. 701
Heisenberg 1959, p. 84
Heisenberg 1934, p. 701 (my emphasis)
Heisenberg 1934, p. 702
Heisenberg 1936, p. 91 (my emphasis)
Quine 1969, p. 21 f.
Leplin 1984
Seelig 1952, p.45; Sommerfeld 1955, p.37 (engl. transi. in 1949, p.99)
Ostwald 1902, p.3
Sommerfeld 1948, pp.640ff
Helmholtz 1862; Jungnickel/McCormmach 1986, vol.1, pp.23f
Quoted from Jaki 1966, p.341
Ostwald 1902, p.l
Boltzmann 1990, pp.l2ff, 152ff (engl. transi. in 1974, pp. 153-8); see also Einstein 1934, p. 113 (engl. transi. in 1954, p.270f)
Plato, Theaetetus 151d-186e
Descartes, Meditations, esp. Med.l and 6
Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, B XXXIX, B 274ff
Moore 1939, pp.127ff, 146
Helmholtz 1879, pp.l8f
There were also, of course, adherents of the corpuscular philosophical tradition, see the discussion in Du Bois-Reymond 1872
Blackmore 1982; see also Elkana 1971 and Brush 1990, pp.53ff
Boltzmann 1974, p.202
Kirchhoff 1872, Vorrede
Boltzmann 1905, pp.137f (engl. transi. in 1974, pp.90f)
ibid. p.144 (engl. transi. in 1974, p.96)
ibid. pp.78ff, 145 (engl. transi. in 1974, pp.41ff and 97)
Ostwald 1895, p.162
Boltzmann 1896, vol. I, p.4
Mach 1900, p.362f
Mach 1912, p.467 and Mach 1872, pp.17ff
Instrumentalistic views were common at that time, cf. Pearson 1892, pp.H4f
Mach 1922, p.256
Boltzmann 1905, p. 157
Boltzmann 1990, pp.152f (engl. transi. in Boltzmann 1974, pp.l53f)
Boltzmann 1905, p. 152 (italics mine)
Mach 1900, pp.363f
Einstein 1989, p. 113 (engl. transi. in 1954, p.270)
Scheibe 1988b (this vol. II.6)
Cf. Jost 1979
Planck 1949, p.48
“Die Einheit des physikalischen Weltbildes”, in Planck 1949, 28–51. The following quotations are from pp. 29–31, 45f and 49. See also the reprint in Heilbron 1988, 301–14, and Planck 1910a, pp. 1–9
Concerning this process see Wiener 1900
Planck’s view has been elaborated in Bavink 1947
Planck 1949, pp. 47–51. For the Planck-Mach controversy see also Heilbron 1986, Ch.II.1
Mach 1910; see also Adler 1909
Thiele 1968, p.90
Planck 1910b
Sommerfeld 1936, p.610
Planck never gave up his position. See his “Positivismus und reale Außenwelt” of 1930 in Planck 1949, pp.228–245, and a later controversy in Müller 1940 and Planck 1940
Sommerfeld 1929, p.l
Einstein 1955b, p.500 (engl. transi. in 1949b, p.674)
Einstein 1955c, p.14
Cf. Scheibe 1992b (this vol. II.8)
Einstein 1955a, p.8 (engl. transi. in 1949a, p.21)
Planck 1949, p.VI
The following three quotations are from Einstein 1955b, pp. 500, 496 and 505 (engl. transi. in 1949b, pp. 674, 668 and 680)
Einstein here paraphrases a statement of Kant’s in his Critique of Pure Reason, B 526f. It says that, given something conditioned, in the domain of appearances the regress in the series of its conditions is only put to us (aufgegeben) whereas in the domain of things-in-themselves it would already be given (gegeben).
Blanshard 1939, vol.11, p.264
Quoted from Holton 1968, p.660 (german original in Holton 1981, p.233)
Einstein 1924, p.1685f
Einstein 1955b, p.496 (engl. transi. in 1949b, p.669)
See for this Blanshard 1939, vol.11, pp.225ff
Einstein 1989, p. 131 (italics mine) (engl. transi. in 1954, p.232)
Einstein 1950, p.15 (italics mine)
Einstein 1929, pp.126f
Einstein 1984, pp.67ff (engl. transi. in 1954, pp.293ff)
Einstein 1950, p.15
Einstein 1989, p. 109 (engl. transi. in 1954, p.226)
Cf. Putnam 1984, pp.l40f
Einstein 1984, 65 (engl. transi. in 1954, p.292)
Einstein 1950, p. 13
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Scheibe, E. (2001). The Philosophy of the Physicists. In: Falkenburg, B. (eds) Between Rationalism and Empiricism. Springer, New York, NY. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4613-0183-7_2
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