Abstract
The problem of objectivity centers on the question: What can we Know about reality The dominant epistemology (theory of Knowledge) underlying most accounts of cognition begins with the assumption that the world, i.e., objective reality, exists independently of we who observe it. Thus, the logical imperative for the philosopher, psychologist, or neurophysiologist is to account for how we perceive and Know about such a world.
What we know is generally considered to be the result of our exploration of the real world, of the way things really are. . . . How we know is a far more vexing problem. To solve it, the mind needs to step outside itself, so to speak for at this point we are no longer with facts that apparently exist independently of us in the outside world ...
Paul Watzlawick
Cloquet hated reality but realized it was still the only place to get a good steak.
Woody Allen
The fish is the last one to know that it lives in the water.
Chinese aphorism
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Segal, L. (2001). The Myth of Objectivity. In: The Dream of Reality. Springer, New York, NY. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4613-0115-8_2
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