Abstract
In the first few sections of Chapter I we introduced the definitions of a noncooperative game and an equilibrium situation. The rationale behind the desire and tendency of the players to attain equilibrium situations was explained. Such a tendency towards equilibrium can thus be viewed as a kind of optimal behavior. A very important fact associated with these concepts is that an equilibrium situation is indeed attainable for a substantially wide class of noncooperative games. Hence the notion of an equilibrium situation is not only logically sound but is also practically useful.
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© 1977 Springer-Verlag, New York Inc.
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Vorob’ev, N.N. (1977). Noncooperative games. In: Game Theory. Applications of Mathematics, vol 7. Springer, New York, NY. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4612-6341-8_3
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4612-6341-8_3
Publisher Name: Springer, New York, NY
Print ISBN: 978-1-4612-6343-2
Online ISBN: 978-1-4612-6341-8
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