Abstract
Probably no Constitutional issue has created as much interest in academic circles over the past several years as has the development of the Constitutional right of privacy and, with the exception of the debate over affirmative action, no issue has led to such a volume of both judicial and scholarly writing. There are now several excellent descriptions, analyses, and histories of the right of privacy.1 The purpose of this survey presentation is to evaluate the development of the Constitutional right of privacy and those social policies that must underlie it in order to determine how the United States Supreme Court might apply the right of privacy to drug prohibitions and regulations and what implications the underlying social policies ought to have for our drug laws.
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References and Notes
See Corwin, The “Higher Law” Background of American Constitutional Law, 42 Harv. L. Rev. 149 (1928); Gerety, Redefining Privacy, 12 Harv. Civ. Rts.—Civ. Lib. L. Rev. 233 (1977); Reiman, Privacy, Intimacy, and Personhood, 6 Phil. & Pub. Aff. 26 (1976); Thomson, The Right to Privacy, 4 Phil. & Pub. Aff. 295 (1975); Warren and Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 Harv. L. Rev. 193 (1890); Comment, A Taxonomy of Privacy: Repose, Sanctuary, and Intimate Decision, 64 Cal. L. Rev. 1447 (1976); Gavison, Privacy and the Limits of Law, 89 Yale L. J. 421 (1980); Westin, Privacy and Freedom(1967); Glancy, The Invention of the Right to Privacy, 21 Ariz. L. Rev. 1 (1979).
Warren and Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 Harv. L. Rev. 193 (1890).
Id. at 205.
Union Pacific Railway Co. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891).
US Constitution, Amendment XIV.
Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 US 390, 399 (1923).
Id. at 402.
Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 US 510 (1925).
Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 US 510, 535 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 US 390, 400 (1923).
See Lochner v. New York, 198 US 45 (1905).
See Adkins v. Childrens Hospital, 261 US 525 (1913).
See Coppage v. Kansas, 236 US 1 (1915).
See Gunther, Constitutional Law 502 (1980).
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 US 479 (1965).
Id. at 484.
Id. at 484.
Id. at 485–486.
Id. at 486.
Id. at 488. Justice Goldberg wrote the concurring opinion, in which Chief Justice Warren and Justice Brennan joined.
Id. at 499–502.
The phrase was first used by Justice Cardozo to define that which was included within the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment in Palko v. Connecticut, 302 US 319, 325 (1937).
Poe v. Ullman, 367 US 497 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
Id. at 542.
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 US 479, 510 (1965) (Black, J., dissenting).
Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 US 438 (1972).
Id. at 453.
Stanley v. Georgia, 394 US 557 (1969).
Doe v. Bolton, 410 US 179 (1973); Roe v. Wade, 410 US 113 (1973).
Roe v. Wade, 410 US 113, 152 (1973).
Id. at 159.
Doe v. Bolton, 410 US 179, 211 (1973) (Douglas, J., concurring).
Id.
Id. at 213.
The Court recently reaffirmed Roe v. Wade in City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc., 51 USLW 4767 (US, June 15, 1983). Congress had attempted to exert its power over abortion. One “Right to Life” Amendment, SJR 3, failed passage 49 to 50 in June, 1983. Other Right to Life Amendments have been introduced (SJR 8, 9) and are awaiting action.
See, e.g., H.L. v. Matheson, 450 US 393 (1981); Bellotti v. Baird, 443 US 622 (1979); Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 US 52 (1976).
Harris v. McRae, 448 US 297 (1980); Beal v. Doe, 432 US 438 (1977); Maher v. Roe, 432 US 464 (1977); Poelker v. Doe, 432 US 519 (1977).
Whalen v. Roe, 429 US 589 (1977).
Id. at 594.
Id. at 600.
Id.
Id. at 603.
United States v. Rutherford, 422 US 544 (1979). Subsequently, at least one federal court has upheld a challenge to a statute designed to deny unconventional medical treatment to those seeking it. In And: ews v. Ballard, 498 F. Supp 1038 (SD, Tex. 1980), the court held that a patient had the right to obtain accupuncture from other than a physician, contrary to the Texas Medical Practice Act. See also, Laissez Faire in the Medical Marketplace—Recognition of a Constitutional Right to Unconventional Medical Treatment: Andrews v. Ballard, 18 New Eng. L. Rev. 149 (1982); The Uncertain Application of the Right of Privacy in Personal Medical Decisions: The Laetrile Cases, 42 Ohio St. L. J. 523 (1981); Ainsworth and Hall, Laetrile: May the State Intervene on Behalf of a Minor? 30 U. Kan. L. Rev. 409 (1982); and Volzer, Laetrile and The Privacy Right in Decisional Responsibility, 26 Med. Trial Tech. Q. 395 (1980).
Rutherford v. United States, 438 F. Supp. 1287 (WD, Okla. 1977).
Rutherford v. United States, 582 F.2d 1234 (10th Cir. 1978).
United States v. Rutherford, 442 US 544 (1979).
Rutherford v. United States, 616 F.2d 455 (10th Cir. 1980).
Rutherford v. United States, 449 US 937 (1980).
Privitera v. California, 444 US 949 (1979).
People v. Privitera, 74 Cal. App. 3d 936, 141 Cal. Rptr. 764 (1978).
Id. at 784.
People v. Privitera, 23 Cal. 3d 697, 591 P.2d 919, 153 Cal. Rptr. 431 (1979).
See, e. g., Meulders-Klein, The Right Over One’s Own Body: It s Scope and Limits in Comparative Law, 6 B.C. Int’l. & Comp. L. Rev. 29 (1983); Goldberg, “Interpretations” of “Due Process of Law”—A Study in Futility, 13 Pac. L. J. 365 (1982); Dworkin, “Natural” Law Revisited, 34 U. Fla. L. Rev. 165 (1982); Ross, A Natural Rights Basis for Sub- stantive Due Process of Law in US Jurisprudence, 2 Univ. Human Rights 61 (1980); and Gavison, Positivism and the Limits of Jurispru- dence: A Modern Round, 91 Yale L. J. 1250 (1982).
Olmstead v. United States, 277 US 438, 478 (1928).
Stanley v. Georgia, 394 US 557, 565–566 (1969).
Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 US 49, 67–68 (1973).
Rogers v. Okin, 478 F. Supp. 1342, 1367 (D. Mass. 1979). For subsequent history of this case, see fn. 58.
Kaimowitz v. Department of Mental Health, Civ. No. 73–19434-AW (Mich. Cir. Ct. Wayne Cty., July 10, 1973).
Rogers v. Okin, 478 F. Supp. 1342, 1367 (D. Mass. 1979). The Court of Appeals criticized the district court for its simplistic approach, but generally agreed that drugs should not be forceably administered except under certain conditions. The Court of Appeals found that the right to refuse antipsychotic drugs had its origins in the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 634 F.2d 650 (1st Cir. 1980). The Supreme Court vacated the Court of Appeals decision for essentially procedural reasons in Mills v. Rogers, 102 S. Ct. 2442 (1982). The Supreme Court questioned whether the state’s protection of the individual’s interest was broader than the protection afforded by the United States Constitution. See also Rennie v. Klein, 653 F.2d 836 (3rd Cir. 1981), A Mental Patient’s Right to Refuse Antipsychotic Drugs: A Constitutional Right Needing Protection, 57 Notre Dame L. Rev. 406 (1981); and Symonds, Mental Patients’ Right to Refuse Drugs: Involuntary Medication as Cruel and Unusual Punishment, 7 Hastings Const. L.Q. 701 (1980).
E. Goffman, Asylums(1961).
Griswold v. Connecticut 381 US 479 (1965).
Stanley v. Georgia, 394 US 557 (1969).
Id. at 565.
Ravin v. State 537 P.2d 494 (Alaska 1975).
Id. at 503.
Parham v. J. R., 442 US 584 (1979).
H. L. v. Matheson, 450 US 393 (1981); Bellotti v. Baird, 443 US 622 (1979); Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 US 52 (1976).
Bellotti v. Baird, 443 US 622, 633–34 (1979).
Gunther, Constitutional Law 671 (1980).
Id. at 670–671.
Id. at 671.
United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 US 144 (1938).
See Laetrile: The Making of a Myth, HEW Pub. No. (FDA) 77–3031; Toxicity of Laetrile, FDA Drug Bulletin 7 (5) (Nov.-Dec. 1977).
See e.g., State v. Craig, 19 Ohio App. 2d 29, 249 N.E. 2d 75 (1969); State v. Odegaard, 165 N.W. 2d 677 (N.D. 1969); State v. Albertson, 93 Idaho 64, 470 P.2d 300 (1970); State v. Lombard, 241 A.2d 625 (R.I. 1968); and Simon v. Sargent, 346 F. Supp. 277 (D. Mass. 1972), aff’d mem., 409 US 1020 (1972). The Ohio helmet law upheld in Craig was repealed in part in 1978 to eliminate the helmet requirement except for those under 18. For an examination of helmet laws, see Helmetless Motorcyclists-Easy Riders Facing Hard Facts: The Rise of the “Motorcycle Helmet Defense,” 41 Ohio St. L. J. 233 (1980).
See, e.g., Ex Parte Hilley, 405 So. 2d 708 (Ala. 1981); In Re Lucille Boyd, 403 A.2d 744 (DC Ct. App. 1979); and Hamilton v. McAuliffe, 277 Md. 336, 353 A.2d 634 (Ct. App. 1976).
Tribe, American Constitutional Law (1978), 938–941.
See note 73, supra.
See, e.g., Manual Enterprises v. Day, 370 US 478 (1962); Hearn v. Short, 327 F. Supp. 33 (S.D. Texas 1971); and Auginblick v. US, 206 Ct. Cl. 74, 509 F. 2d 1157 (1975). See also, Commonwealth v. Bonadio, 490 Pa. 91, 415 A.2d 47 (1980); People v. Onofre, 51 NY 2d 476, 415 N.E. 2d 936 (1980), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 2323 (1981); Commonwealth v. Bonadio: Voluntary Deviate Sexual Intercourse—A Comparative Analysis, 43 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 253 (1981); and Sexual Morality and the Constitution: People v. Onofre, 46 Albany L. Rev. (1981). In Onofre and Bonadio, the courts struck down sodomy statutes as unconstitutional.
See, e.g., H. R. Rep. No. 2464, 87th Cong., 2d Sess., enumerating the purposes of the Drug Amendments of 1962.
This argument has also been advanced to support deprogramming of those in religious cults. See, Delgado, Religious Totalism as Slavery, 9 NYU Rev. Law and Soc. Change 51 (1979).
Quoted in Tribe at 817.
See note 73, supra.
Bellotti v. Baird, 443 US 622 (1979); Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 US 52 (1976); H. L. v. Matheson, 450 US 393 (1981).
See, People v. Woody, 61 Cal. 2d 716, 394 P.2d 813, 40 Cal. Rptr. 69 (1964).
Gunther, Constitutional Law 1585 (1980). See Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 US 296 (1940); and Reynolds v. United States, 98 US 145 (1878).
People v. Woody, 61 Cal. 2d 716, —, 394 P.2d 813, 816–818, 40 Cal. Rptr. 69, 72–74 (1964).
United States v. Kuch, 288 F. Supp. 439 (D.D.C. 1968).
Id.
In Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 US 88 (1940), the Court invalidated on free speech grounds an Alabama law prohibiting picketing. However, the Court has distinguished speech from conduct, and its decisions on “symbolic speech” are inconsistent. Compare Cox v. Louisiana, 379 US 559 (1965) with Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 US 299 (1963). See generally, Tribe, supra, at 598–601.
Tribe, supra, 940–941.
See Railway Express Agency v. New York, 336 US 106 (1949).
See, e.g., California v. La Rue, 409 US 109 (1972); Lar kin v. Grendels’ Den, Inc., 51 USLW 4025 (1982); Women’s Liberation Union of Rhode Island v. Israel, 379 F. Supp. 44 (D.R.I. 1974).
California v. La Rue, 409 US 109 (1972). But see Craig v. Boren, 429 US 190 (1976).
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Schwartz, R. (1984). Implications of the Constitutional Right of Privacy for the Control of Drugs. In: Murray, T.H., Gaylin, W., Macklin, R. (eds) Feeling Good and Doing Better. Contemporary Issues in Biomedicine, Ethics, and Society. Humana Press. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4612-5168-2_8
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