Abstract
In one way or another the writings of Mead and Wittgenstein, Bruner and Vygotsky all suggest that the way the mentation of persons is organized is the result of the imposition of a structure that stems ultimately from language. For example conceptions of self are not a native endowment but a product of social forces mediated by favored grammatical models for self-ascription and self-exhortation. I want to sketch one of the ways in which social forces could be responsible for the genesis of selves. In essence this is through apprentice persons acquiring the linguistic resources for acts of self- description.
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Reference
Harre, R. (1983). Personal being. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Pouwer, J. (1973). Signification and field work: Journal of Symbolic Anthropology, 1.
Wittgenstein, L. (1963). Philosophical investigations, Oxford: Blackwell.
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Harré, R. (1985). The Language Game of Self-Ascription: A Note. In: Gergen, K.J., Davis, K.E. (eds) The Social Construction of the Person. Springer Series in Social Psychology. Springer, New York, NY. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4612-5076-0_14
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4612-5076-0_14
Publisher Name: Springer, New York, NY
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