Abstract
The paper deals with some issues of dynamic game modelling and management strategy, in particular pertaining to a firm’s market strategy. The interface between the dynamic game formalism and the design of market strategies is emphasized. The paper provides a characterization of dynamic game models and proceeds to discuss the relative merits of repeated games, differential (difference) games, and games of incomplete information, with a view to assess their potential use as support in management strategy decisions.
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© 1995 Birkhäuser Boston
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Jørgensen, S. (1995). Dynamic Game Theory and Management Strategy. In: Olsder, G.J. (eds) New Trends in Dynamic Games and Applications. Annals of the International Society of Dynamic Games, vol 3. Birkhäuser Boston. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4612-4274-1_22
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4612-4274-1_22
Publisher Name: Birkhäuser Boston
Print ISBN: 978-1-4612-8719-3
Online ISBN: 978-1-4612-4274-1
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