Optimal Selection of Observation Times in a Costly Information Game

  • Geert Jan Olsder
  • Odile Pourtallier
Part of the Annals of the International Society of Dynamic Games book series (AISDG, volume 3)

Abstract

Pursuit evasion games with costly and asymmetric information are studied. It is supposed that the evader has perfect information about the position of the pursuer (and himself) at each instant of time whereas the pursuer gets information about the position of the evader only at discrete instants. Furthermore we suppose that the pursuer cannot move during a given period of time while he gathers this information. We investigate both the case in which the instants of observation are chosen by the pursuer in an open loop way (at the beginning of the game) and the case in which he chooses these instants according to the last information obtained (i.e., he chooses in a feedback way).

Keywords

Terion 

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Copyright information

© Birkhäuser Boston 1995

Authors and Affiliations

  • Geert Jan Olsder
    • 1
  • Odile Pourtallier
    • 2
  1. 1.Delft University of TechnologyThe Netherlands
  2. 2.INRIA Sophia-AntipolisFrance

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