The Conceptual Distinction between Propositional and Skillful Knowing
A conceptual analysis of the distinction between propositional and skillful knowing is presented, in terms of the technical language of propositional attitude theory. The two types of knowing are shown to differ in important ways with respect to such features as content, objective correlate, Intentional modality, mode of representation, direction of fit, and associated boundary conditions.
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