The Dually Diagnosed Client in the Criminal Justice System

  • Ruth Luckasson
Part of the Disorders of Human Learning, Behavior, and Communication book series (HUMAN LEARNING)

Abstract

Persons with mental illness who come into contact with the criminal justice system have been and continue to be the subject of a great deal of attention. Both the popular media and scholars have long focused on the plight of mentally ill criminal defendants. In contrast, the legal problems of individuals with mental retardation who come into contact with the criminal justice system have, as a group, rarely attracted the attention of scholars.1 Even criminal laws which on their face purport to address mental retardation often, upon examination, reveal considerations of mental illness but not of mental retardation. The individuals who are our focus here, those who have both mental retardation and mental illness, seem to have garnered even less reflection. They suffer the inattention accorded the defendants with mental retardation alone and engender none of the study for which people with mental illness are the focus. Consequently, this book is of vital importance in concentrating the efforts of leaders in the field and drawing the attention of policymakers to dually diagnosed individuals in the criminal justice system.

Keywords

Alan 

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References

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag New York Inc. 1988

Authors and Affiliations

  • Ruth Luckasson

There are no affiliations available

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