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Entry, Divorce and Re-Marriage in Matching Markets

  • Elaine Bennett

Abstract

This paper investigates the effect of entry on marriage markets. The paper presents a natural adjustment process for marriage markets and shows that entry on one side of the market makes that side worse off and the other side better off than before entry occurred. An example shows that the adjustment process described by Roth and Vande Vate lacks this property; there may be winners and losers on both sides.

Keywords

Marriage Market Stable Match Strict Preference Assignment Game Match Market 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag New York, Inc. 1994

Authors and Affiliations

  • Elaine Bennett
    • 1
  1. 1.Department of EconomicsVirginia Polytechnic Institute and State UniversityBlacksburgUSA

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