Entry, Divorce and Re-Marriage in Matching Markets
This paper investigates the effect of entry on marriage markets. The paper presents a natural adjustment process for marriage markets and shows that entry on one side of the market makes that side worse off and the other side better off than before entry occurred. An example shows that the adjustment process described by Roth and Vande Vate lacks this property; there may be winners and losers on both sides.
KeywordsMarriage Market Stable Match Strict Preference Assignment Game Match Market
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
- V. Crawford, “Comparative Statics in Matching Markets,” Journal of Economic Theory, to appear.Google Scholar
- D. E. Knuth, Marriages Stables, Les Presses de l’Universite de Montreal, 1976.Google Scholar
- A. E. Roth, “The Evolution of the Labor Market for Medical Interns and Residents: A Case Study in Game Theory,” Journal of Political Economy 36 (1984) 277–288.Google Scholar
- A. E. Roth and M. Sotomayor, Two-Sided Matching: A Study in Game-Theoretic Modelling and Analysis, Cambridge University Press, 1990.Google Scholar