Abstract
In this paper a conflict between a potential criminal offender and a law enforcement agency is studied. The model is a two-stage extensive form game with imperfect information. We identify all relevant sequential equilibria of the game and show how the equilibrium strategies and game values of both players depend on the parameter values. Further, it is shown that in equilibrium the offense rate and the law enforcement rate in the first period are always less than or equal to that in the second period. It is also established for multistage games that these two rates are monotonously nonincreasing; however, this property disappears if recidivistic behavior is present.
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© 2000 Springer Science+Business Media New York
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Dawid, H., Feichtinger, G., Jørgensen, S. (2000). Crime and Law Enforcement: A Multistage Game. In: Filar, J.A., Gaitsgory, V., Mizukami, K. (eds) Advances in Dynamic Games and Applications. Annals of the International Society of Dynamic Games, vol 5. Birkhäuser, Boston, MA. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4612-1336-9_19
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4612-1336-9_19
Publisher Name: Birkhäuser, Boston, MA
Print ISBN: 978-1-4612-7100-0
Online ISBN: 978-1-4612-1336-9
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