Refinement of the Nash Solution for Games with Perfect Information

  • Leon A. Petrosjan
Conference paper
Part of the Annals of the International Society of Dynamic Games book series (AISDG, volume 5)


The n-person finite games with perfect information are considered. It is well known that the subgame perfectness assumption does not lead to the unique Nash equilibria (NE). Thus the problem arises of how to choose a unique subgame perfect NE. It is proved that by introducing the so-called “preference vector” for each player a unique subgame (in the sense of payoffs) NE can be constructed. The application of the approach to the “lifeline” simple pursuit game with one pursuer and two evaders enables us to find a unique subgame (in the sense of payoffs) NE in this differential game also.


Nash Equilibrium Differential Game Perfect Information Type Strategy Subgame Perfect Equilibrium 
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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media New York 2000

Authors and Affiliations

  • Leon A. Petrosjan
    • 1
  1. 1.St. Petersburg State UniversitySt. PetersburgRussia

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