Abstract
As we have seen, the central pillar of Bohr’s Copenhagen Interpretation is complementarity. The usual textbook definition of “complementarity” says that it applies to “apparently” incompatible constructs, such as waves and particles, or variables, such as position and momentum. Because one of the paired constructs or variables cannot define the situation in the quantum world in the absence of the other, both are required for a complete view of the actual physical situation. Thus a description of nature in this special case requires that the paired constructs or variables be viewed as complementary, meaning that both constitute a complete view of the situation but only one can be applied in a given situation. The textbook definition usually concludes with the passing comment that because the experimental situation determines which complementary construct or variable will be displayed, complementarity assumes that entities in the quantum world, like electrons or photons, do not have definite properties apart from our observation of them.
I am afraid of this word Reality.
Arthur Eddington
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Reffences
Niels Bohr, Atomic Theory and the Description of Nature( Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1961 ), pp. 4–34.
See Clifford A. Hooker, “The Nature of Quantum Mechanical Reality,” in Paradigms and Paradoxes, pp. 161–2. Also see Niels Bohr, Atomic Physics and Human Knowledge (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1958), pp. 26, 34, 72, 88ff, and Atomic Theory and the Description of Nature, (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1961) pp. 5, 8, 16ff, 53, 94.
Niels Bohr, “Causality and Complementarity,” Philosophy of Science, 1960, 4, pp. 293–4.
Ibid.
Clifford A. Hooker, “The Nature of Quantum Mechanical Reality,” p. 137.
See Abraham Pais, Subtle Is the Lord( New York: Oxford University Press, 1982 ), p. 456.
Leon Rosenfeld, “Niels Bohr’s Contributions to Epistemology,” Physics Today, April 29, 1961,190, p. 50.
Niels Bohr, Atomic Theory and the Description of Nature, pp. 54–5.
Niels Bohr, “Discussions with Einstein on Epistemological Issues,” in Henry Folse, The Philosophy of Niels Bohr: The Framework of Complementarity( Amsterdam: North Holland Physics Publishing, 1985 ), pp. 237–8.
Niels Bohr, Atomic Physics and Human Knowledge, pp. 64, 73. Also see Clifford A. Hooker’s detailed and excellent discussion of these points in “The Nature of Quantum Mechanical Reality,” pp. 57–302.
Clifford A. Hooker, “The Nature of Quantum Mechanical Reality,” p. 155.
Niels Bohr, Atomic Physics and Human Knowledge, p. 74.
Niels Bohr, Atomic Theory and the Description of Nature, pp. 56–7.
Niels Bohr, Atomic Physics and Human Knowledge, p. 74.
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Niels Bohr, quoted in A. Peterson, “The Philosophy of Niels Bohr,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, September 1963, p. 12.
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See Melic Capek, “Do the New Concepts of Space and Time Require a New Metaphysics,” in The World View of Contemporary Physics, ed. Richard E. Kitchener (Albany, N.Y.: S.U.N.Y. Press, 1988 ), pp. 90104.
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Gottlob Frege to Bertrand Russell, 22 June, 1902, Ibid, p. 127.
Kurt Gödel, “On Formally Undecidable Propositions of Principia Mathematicaand Similar Systems,” in From Frege to Gödel, trans. and ed. Jean van Heijenoort (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1967 ).
See Ernst Nagel and James R. Newman, “Gödel’s Proof,” in Newman, ed., The World View of Mathematics(New York: Simon and Schuster, 1956), pp. 1668–1669 and Ernst Nagel and James R. Newman, Gödel’s Proof( New York: New York University Press, 1958 ).
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Kafatos, M., Nadeau, R. (2000). Changing the Rules: A New Epistemology of Science. In: The Conscious Universe. Springer, New York, NY. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4612-1308-6_5
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4612-1308-6_5
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