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Winner Determination in Multi-unit Procurement Auctions with Volume Discount Bids and Lead Time Constraints

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Applications of Multi-Criteria and Game Theory Approaches

Part of the book series: Springer Series in Advanced Manufacturing ((SSAM))

Abstract

In this chapter, we consider the problem of determining an optimal set of winning suppliers in a procurement auction where the buyer wishes to procure high volumes of a homogeneous item in a staggered way in accordance with a predefined schedule and the suppliers respond with bids that specify volume discounts and also delivery lead times. We show that the winner determination problem, which turns out to be a multi-objective optimization problem, cannot be satisfactorily solved by traditional methods of multi-objective optimization. We formulate the problem first as an integer program with constraints capturing lead time requirements and show that the integer program is an extended version of the multiple knapsack problems. We discover certain properties of this integer program and exploit the properties to simplify it to a 0–1 mixed integer program (MIP), which can be solved more efficiently. We next explore a more efficient approach to solving the problem using a linear relaxation of the 0–1 MIP in conjunction with a greedy heuristic. Using extensive numerical experimentation, we show the efficacy of the 0–1 MIP and the proposed heuristic.

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Correspondence to Y. Narahari .

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Verma, D.K., Hemachandra, N., Narahari, Y., Tew, J.D. (2014). Winner Determination in Multi-unit Procurement Auctions with Volume Discount Bids and Lead Time Constraints. In: Benyoucef, L., Hennet, JC., Tiwari, M. (eds) Applications of Multi-Criteria and Game Theory Approaches. Springer Series in Advanced Manufacturing. Springer, London. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4471-5295-8_13

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4471-5295-8_13

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