Abstract
This chapter uses game theory to evaluate different strategic cross-plant precaution collaboration situations. An application of the model is provided and explains how cross-plant precaution in chemical clusters may be enhanced and realized despite limited resources available to the Multi-plant council (MPC).
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Notes
- 1.
The MPC obviously needs to have an internal working budget for its base cost of existence (man hours, office, etc.), but we assume that there is no external ‘incentive budget’ available that can be used by the MPC to stimulate domino prevention collaboration between companies.
- 2.
A strategic situation is defined as a simultaneous strategy selection, one for each plant. Each strategic situation results in a different pay-off or investment cost for each player.
References
Hubbart DW (2009) The failure of risk management: why it’s broken and how to fix it. John Wiley and Sons, Hoboken
Reniers GLL, Cuypers S, Pavlova Y (2012) A game-theory based multi-plant collaboration model (MCM) for cross-plant prevention in a chemical cluster. J Hazard Mater 209:164–176
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© 2013 Springer-Verlag London
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Reniers, G., Pavlova, Y. (2013). Cooperative Incentives Approach in Case of an MPC with Limited Resources. In: Using Game Theory to Improve Safety within Chemical Industrial Parks. Springer Series in Reliability Engineering. Springer, London. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4471-5052-7_6
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4471-5052-7_6
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