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Research of Tow Class Supply Chain with a Retailer-led Under Demand Uncertainty Based on Game Theory

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Proceedings of the International Conference on Information Engineering and Applications (IEA) 2012

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Electrical Engineering ((LNEE,volume 216))

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Abstract

The two-class retailer-led supply chain equilibrium model is established under demand uncertainty in this paper. The conclusion can be verified that the enterprises of the supply chain can achieve the optimal total profit as well as individual income through cooperation based on the Stackelberg game theory. In order to maintain the stable cooperation between enterprises of the supply chain, applying cooperation mechanism with buy-back contract can realize the win–win state on supply chain enterprises.

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Acknowledgments

The authors are grateful to the helpful comment by the anonymous referees. The authors also thank the financial support of the Fundamental Research Funds for the Central Universities (Grant No. DL10BB05).

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Correspondence to Yang Li .

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© 2013 Springer-Verlag London

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Li, Y., Cong, L., Guo, W. (2013). Research of Tow Class Supply Chain with a Retailer-led Under Demand Uncertainty Based on Game Theory . In: Zhong, Z. (eds) Proceedings of the International Conference on Information Engineering and Applications (IEA) 2012. Lecture Notes in Electrical Engineering, vol 216. Springer, London. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4471-4856-2_38

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4471-4856-2_38

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  • Publisher Name: Springer, London

  • Print ISBN: 978-1-4471-4855-5

  • Online ISBN: 978-1-4471-4856-2

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