Providing Assurance on the Absence of Unknown Activities

  • Jack L. King
Conference paper

Abstract

After the startling discovery of a clandestine nuclear weapons program in Iraq, the effectiveness of the verification methodologies used for international agreements on nuclear non-proliferation was called into review. Traditional techniques such as surveillance, containment, and material accountancy [1] are designed to provide assurance that no nuclear material has been diverted for military use. Clearly such techniques can only be applied to known nuclear activities, where direct measurement and observation is possible.

Keywords

IAEA Iraq Preconceive 

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag London 1996

Authors and Affiliations

  • Jack L. King
    • 1
  1. 1.Safeguards DepartmentInternational Atomic Energy AgencyViennaAustria

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